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Richard J. Wilson*
Myers: I would say, despite their age, these are very, very dangerous people. . . So they may be
juveniles, but they're not on a little-league team anywhere, they're on a major league team, and
it's a terrorist team. . .
Rumsfeld: This constant refrain of ‘the juveniles,’ as though there’s a hundred children in there
— these are not children. Dick Myers responded to that.1
***
As this discussion establishes, ‘[o]ur history is replete with laws and judicial recognition’ that
children cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults.2
***
One of my motivations in seeking a reasonable resolution of the case is that, as a juvenile at the
time of his capture, Jawad should have been segregated from the adult detainees, and some
serious attempt made to rehabilitate him. I am bothered by the fact that this was not done. I am a
resolute Catholic and take as an article of faith that justice is defined as reparative and
restorative, and that Christ's most radical pronouncement - command, if you will - is to love
one's enemies.3
<>
*
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1
General Richard Myers, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Defense
Department press conference of April 25, 2003, responding to press inquiries on new public information that
juveniles were detained at Guantanamo. U.S. Department of Defense, DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and
Gen. Myers, April 25, 2003, at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2510, visited on
December 26, 2011.
2
From the majority opinion of Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2404
(2011), quoting from Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-116 (1982), and holding that “so long as the child's
age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a
reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test.” Id. at
2406. If in custody for alleged criminal conduct, the child must be given Miranda warnings.
3
From the Declaration of Lt. Col. Darrell J. Vandeveld on the occasion of his resignation as chief prosecutor in
another juvenile prosecution at Guantanamo, Jawad v. United States (Military Commission) (Sept. 22, 2008),
available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/docs/vandeveld_declaration_080922.pdf, visited on Dec. 8,
2011.
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Introduction
Omar Khadr, age 15 and a citizen of Canada, was given emergency medical care for
near-fatal gun-shot wounds and taken into custody by U.S. forces in Afghanistan on July 27,
2002. U.S. military forces had been in that country since October of 2001, only a month after the
devastating attacks on the United States of September 11. Omar Khadr was, without doubt, a
child on the date of his detention and all prior dates of his alleged criminal conduct. He was,
however, caught up on that July day in a prolonged military encounter with deaths on both sides
including, very nearly, his own. Some would thus first characterize him not as a child but as a
combatant – “child soldier” is the term most often applied in such situations, but the more neutral
“child in armed conflict” is generally used here.4
Omar, badly wounded with two near-fatal gunshots to the back, was held and
interrogated immediately and aggressively at Bagram Air Force Base near Kabul for several
months before his transfer to Guantanamo Bay after he had turned 16.5 Omar spent two years at
Guantanamo undergoing regular, routine and sometimes brutal interrogation without
representation by counsel, and four years in all before he was charged by a military commission
with war crimes.6 He was ultimately classified by the United States government as an “alien
unprivileged enemy belligerent,” susceptible to charges by military commission for his unlawful
4

Professor Marc Drumbl suggests in a forthcoming book that the terminology in the field has moved toward
“children associated with armed forces or armed groups,” acknowledging its “somewhat tongue-tying” nature. I will
use the term suggested in the text. Marc A. Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy,
Washington & Lee Public Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Accepted Paper No. 2011-17, September 2, 2011,
on SSRN at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1921527, visited on November 18, 2011.
5
The best and most accurate portrayal of the interrogation regime at Bagram during that period of time is in the
documentary film, “Taxi to the Dark Side,” a chilling examination of torture and death at Bagram. Omar Khadr’s
were among those interviewed on-screen.
6
Because we all have become inured with, or perhaps numbed by, the issue of prolonged detention at Guantanamo
without trial, we have lost our shock at the unlawfulness of untimely trial itself. We must note that most U.S.
jurisdictions require trial within 90 to 180 days of detention of the accused, at risk that all charges can be dismissed
for failure to honor the constitutional obligation of speedy trial. See Richard J. Wilson, Guantanamo: It’s About
Time, Bangor Daily News, March 25, 2009.
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acts in combat. It was the view of commission prosecutors that his belligerent status denied him
the protections of both human rights and humanitarian law, for reasons that will be developed
below. This essay explores the intersections and tensions between international human rights law
and international humanitarian law as those two doctrinal areas played out in the concrete
situation of Omar Khadr, with particular focus on how issues regarding his youth were addressed
by the many tribunals involved. The issues on Omar’s youth ran through many contexts, raising
judicial questions regarding the legality of his detention, his treatment and separation from adults
while detained, jurisdiction over him for prosecution for war crimes, and the inadmissibility of
statements based on his youth.
I served as pro bono counsel for Omar Khadr between October of 2004 and the spring of
2007, when we ceased representation at his request.7 During that time, I visited with him in the
detention facilities at Guantanamo on about a dozen occasions and appeared as his lawyer in
habeas corpus proceedings to challenge his detention in the federal courts of Washington, D.C. I
also served as his civilian counsel in the first military commission hearings held at Guantanamo,
prior to the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which struck down the
commissions as then composed.8 In addition, as part of our work in the International Human
Rights Law Clinic at American University, I appeared with students in federal court and at the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, first on behalf all detainees at Guantanamo, and
later seeking precautionary measures from the United States government on behalf of Omar

7

From the outset, I worked closely with co-counsel, Prof. Muneer Ahmad, a colleague on the faculty at American
University’s Washington College of Law. Most of our visits with Omar were together, but sometimes he or I went to
the base alone, and later I was joined by another faculty member, Prof. Kristine Huskey, on one occasion. Students
in the International Human Rights Law Clinic assisted in all aspects of representation discussed in this article, to the
extent that their clearance status permitted. With the exception of one semester, no student was given a security
clearance to have access to classified documents, including client statements, unless they were cleared for public
viewing by a review panel set up for that purpose. Virtually all documents relating to his case were classified.
8
548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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Khadr, based largely on his age at the time of his capture. I can safely say, as a personal matter,
that this was the single most demanding, and most interesting, case of my legal career.
Because he was Canadian, Omar had Canadian lawyers who raised legal challenges in the
domestic courts there, to the extent that those courts were able to intervene in the U.S. legal
process. Those lawyers drew on arguments regarding Omar’s youth at the time of the events that
resulted in his detention, and they were remarkably successful in obtaining favorable decisions
on Omar’s behalf. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan, the Republican-dominated
U.S. Congress quickly reconstituted the military commissions through new legislation and Omar
was again charged with the crimes to which he eventually pled guilty. New military lawyers
were appointed to represent Omar, and his Canadian lawyers took on the role of “legal advisors”
to him at Guantanamo. After our work on Omar’s behalf ended in the spring of 2007, his
appointed military defense lawyers continued to raise issues regarding his youth and status in
both habeas corpus and military commission contexts. It is the combined advocacy on behalf of
Omar Khadr in a rich array of tribunals – US and Canadian federal courts, military commissions,
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the United Nations – from which this
essay emerges.
I will first examine, in part I, the broad context of the Khadr case. That context includes
the Khadr family background, the relevant law relating to children in armed conflict, the overall
situation of juvenile detainees at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere, and a bit of history on the
prosecution of children in armed conflict. In part II, I will document the efforts to put the issue of
Omar’s youth before the Washington federal court in habeas corpus proceedings, including some
effort to develop the facts relating to Omar’s capture and subsequent detention in Afghanistan
and Guantanamo. In part III, I will examine the ways in which the question of juvenile status
4
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affected military commission proceedings, both before and after the Hamdan decision. In part
IV, the role of the Canadian courts in this complex array of litigation will be explored through
the lens of Omar’s age. I will examine the ways in which the issue of Omar’s youth was
addressed in proceedings before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Part V,
and Part VI will discuss the outcome of the Khadr case. It will also offer my own conclusions
and reflections on the ways in which the international law of armed conflict and human rights
interacted in these proceedings.
I.

Context: The Khadr family, the law, juveniles detained at Guantanamo Bay
and elsewhere, and juveniles in war crimes trials in history
It is difficult to decide what constitutes the full factual context of the “Khadr case.” A full

recitation of Omar Khadr’s factual narrative is either forbidden or contested. It is forbidden
because of the draconian limitations placed on all Guantanamo defense lawyers regarding
disclosure of factual information obtained from their clients, or regarding their cases in general.
Virtually all information is treated either as “classified” or “protected,” with such protections
justified on national security grounds.9 It is contested because so much about Guantanamo and
its detainees has yet to become public through careful investigation and historical clarification. If
the crucible of a trial is the vehicle for arriving at the truth of the status of the Guantanamo
detainees themselves, one must recall that of the 779 total detainees ever held there, only five
have been convicted of any crime: four, including Omar, in military commission proceedings,
and one by transfer to the United States for trial. The military commissions, even in their postHamdan iteration, are subject to strong and justified criticism for their lack of fundamental
9

The best summary of these limitations, in my view, is offered in David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in
Guantanamo, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1981 (2008). The most recent absurdity in these limitations is the effort by
government lawyers to prevent the Guantanamo defense lawyers from using or disseminating, in any way, the
materials regarding Guantanamo detainees posted on Wikileaks, which can be read and freely disseminated by
anyone else in the world.
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fairness and transparency. The remaining cases, all in habeas corpus proceedings, continue a
slow slog through the courts.
According to counts by lawyers involved in detainee representation, there are still 171
men at Guantanamo. Thirty-six men in all have been referred for prosecution by military
commission, with one, Ahmed Ghailani, transferred to the U.S. for prosecution, where he was
convicted in federal court proceedings.10 Of the cases in court on habeas corpus, there have been
63 decisions on the merits, with 38 grants and 25 denials. Of those cases, there have been 21
active appeals submitted for decision, with 16 decisions, and 5 petitions for certiorari pending as
of December 2011.11
A. The Khadr Family
One struggles here with the question of whether to view the events surrounding the Khadr
case through the narrow, close-up lens of the single armed confrontation in Afghanistan that led
to his prosecution by military commission; through the context of his prolonged detention,
relentless interrogation and mistreatment by his captors at Bagram Air Force Base and later at
Guantanamo; through the broader lens of Omar’s own life and that of his family; or through the
sweeping history of radical Islam, which both precedes and follows the attacks against the
United States on September 11, 2001.12 I will start with the Khadr family, and provide greater
information about Omar’s own conduct in the conclusion to this article.

10

Email to Guantanamo listserv from David Remes, Dec. 19, 2011, on file with the author. Ghailani, was prosecuted
for his role in the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and was sentenced to life imprisonment in
January of 2011. Benjamin Weiser, Ex-Detainee Gets Life Sentence in Embassy Blasts, N.Y. Times, January 25,
2011.
11
Email to Guantanamo listserv from Brian Foster, Dec. 6, 2011, on file with the author.
12
For a discussion of the issue of the instability of the concept of time-framing in the criminal law, see Mark
Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 593 (1981). One scholar,
a philosopher teaching law, ponders whether a rationally consistent act requirement can be justified at all in the
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The Khadr family was famous – or infamous – in Canada well before Omar’s arrest. His
father, Ahmed, had been arrested in 1995, for his alleged role in the bombing of the Egyptian
embassy in Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad. The Canadian government had intervened in order to
obtain his return to Canada, and all charges were eventually dropped. No charge was ever filed
against Ahmed Khadr alleging criminal links to Al Qaeda, but all of Canada associated the
Khadr family with Ahmed’s designation as “al Kanadi,” the Canadian jihadists.13 The Khadr
family was, in short, notorious in their hometown of Scarborough, a suburb of Toronto, and
throughout the country.
Ahmed Khadr died in an armed confrontation in Pakistan on October 3, 2003, a year after
Omar arrived at Guantanamo. His youngest brother, Kareem, who was with his father at the time
of his capture, would survive but return to Canada in a wheelchair with a severed spine.14 Omar’s
next oldest brother, Abdurahman, spent some time with him at Guantanamo and was said to have
worked as an informant for the CIA,15 while Abdullah, the oldest Khadr sibling, was sought by
the United States for his alleged terrorist activities. Abdullah was returned to Canada from
Pakistan, where he had been held in custody and interrogated using methods that subsequently
caused the Canadian courts to famously deny a request for his extradition to the United States.16
Abdullah was subsequently freed. Omar’s eldest sister, Zaynab, appears in Lawrence Wright’s
Pulitzer Prize-winning book, The Looming Tower, as a friend and confidant of the family of
criminal law. Douglas Husak, Rethinking the Act Requirement, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 2437 (2007) (“[W]e should not
be confident about whether criminal law contains an act requirement . . .” Id., at 2459).
13
Perhaps the most inflammatory of the books accusing the Khadr family of links to terrorism is Stuart Bell’s COLD
TERROR: HOW CANADA NURTURES AND EXPORTS TERRORISM AROUND THE WORLD (2004). Chapter 6 of that
fustian rant is titled “The Al Kanadi Family Jihad.” Id. at 156. Omar is described there as a “very sweet, simple and
easygoing person, . . . loved by his family and friends. . . He is known to be trustworthy. He mainly sticks with . . .
mom and dad. . . He can’t kill a fly.” With that fragment of his character, it is then said that “he would also fall into
the grip of Al Qaeda.” Id. at 169.
14
MICHELLE SHEPHARD, GUANTANAMO’S CHILD: THE UNTOLD STORY OF OMAR KHADR 85 (2008).
15
Id. at 141-144.
16
The appeal affirming the denial of extradition can be found at United States of America v. Khadr, 2011 O.N.C.A.
358 (2011) (Can.).
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Osama bin Laden.17 In short, the Khadr family legacy weighs heavily on Omar. It
unquestionably played a role in Canada’s decision, alone among U.S. allies, not to seek
repatriation to his home country from detention in Cuba.
A. The Law: “Soldiers” in Redefined Paradigms
The law at Guantanamo, and more broadly in the “war on terror,” is opaque, much like
the facts. The United States government’s legal branches and agencies suffered from a special
kind of hubris, brought on by its vengeful response to the attacks of 9/11. Its approach to
international law after 9/11 developed because of many factors, including ignorance, sometimes
willful or politically expedient; the right hand not knowing what the left was doing; and the most
importantly, redefinition of concepts and whole doctrines to serve the purposes of homeland
security, and to justify harsh and aggressive conduct in retaliation for the attacks. The
government, in short, gave new meaning to international law as “soft law” through their efforts
to manipulate it to serve political ends.18
The most fundamental redefinitions, for example, are relevant to the legal terrain under
study here, and deserve explication before beginning a more detailed study of the law applicable
to children in war. They relate to the law to be applied relating to territorial jurisdiction and the
issue of the principle of distinction of civilian from soldier in humanitarian law. One of the first
legal actions taken on behalf of the Guantanamo detainees was a petition filed by certain NGOs
and individuals, including the author, to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(“Commission” or “Inter-American Commission”). The Inter-American Commission is an

17

LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL QAEDA AND THE ROAD TO 9/11, 284-290 (2006).
That many of those positions have not changed a decade after 9/11, when calmer and more careful approaches
should have replaced them, should deeply disturb not just scholars of the field but all who may fall within the scope
of the U.S. exercise of global power.

18
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independent organ of the Organization of American States (OAS), based in Washington, DC, and
composed of seven experts in human rights, appointed in their individual capacity. Together with
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, headquartered in San Jose, Costa Rica, the two
bodies make up the regional human rights protection mechanism for the Americas. The United
States, as an OAS member, is susceptible to the jurisdiction of the Commission (at least in the
Commission’s view) but not the Court, because the U.S. has not ratified the principal human
rights treaty of the Americas, the American Convention on Human Rights. The Commission uses
its powers, inter alia, to hear contentious cases, to comment on human rights situations or issues,
and to make local visits to countries in the Americas.19
The petition was filed on February 25, 2002, just after the first detainees began arriving at
the base in Cuba, asked that the United States government take precautionary measures20 to
determine the status and protect the human rights of detainees then held incommunicado. No
names, no exact numbers of persons, and no countries of origin were known publically at this
point, and no communication was permitted by detainees with the outside world.21 The
Commission quickly issued its decision on March 12, 2002. It called on the United States to
“take the urgent measures necessary to have the legal rights of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay
determined by a competent tribunal.” Given the doubt that existed about the status of the

19

There are many more treaties on human rights in the region of the Americas, and this thumbnail sketch of the
Commission’s powers only begins to document its many roles in human rights protection. The United States
government has never accepted the claim by the Commission that the U.S. is susceptible to Commission jurisdiction.
I have written about the issue of U.S. exceptionalism and the Inter-American human rights system elsewhere in this
law review. Richard J. Wilson, The United States' Position on the Death Penalty in the Inter-American Human
Rights System, 42 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1159 (2002).
20
Precautionary measures are explained more fully infra, at text accompanying n. 162.
21
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Request by the Center for Constitutional Rights, the Human
Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School and the Center for Justice and International Law for Precautionary
Measures under Article 25 of the Commission’s Regulations, February 25, 2002 (on file with the author).
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detainees in international law, the need for resolution by a competent tribunal was urgent.22 The
decision was the first of its kind by any adjudicative body, domestic or international, to address
the human rights of the detainees. It reiterated a well-established framework for its analysis:
“international human rights law applies at all times, in peacetime and in situations of armed
conflict.” In times of armed conflict, the Commission asserted, “no person . . . is devoid of legal
protection for his or her fundamental and non-derogable human rights.”23 Moreover, the
Commission anticipated the extraterritorial jurisdiction aspect of the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush24 by more than two years, by grounding its decision on
the jurisdictional concept that the United States exercised exclusive control over the detainees,
even if the detainees were non-U.S. nationals outside of U.S. territory: “The determination of a
state's responsibility for violations of the international human rights of a particular individual
turns not on that individual's nationality or presence within a particular geographic area, but
rather on whether, under the specific circumstances, that person fell within the state's authority
and control.”25
The United States government took its first public position on the framework within
which the legal status of Guantanamo detainees should be determined in its initial submission to
the Commission, which was transmitted to the petitioners on April 12, 2002.26 In that document,
the government asserted that “international human rights law is not applicable to the conduct of
hostilities or the capture and detention of enemy combatants, which are governed by the more
22

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures (Detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), 41 I.L.M. 532, 533 (2002).
23
Id., at 533.
24
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484, n. 15 (detainees “have been held in executive detention for more than two years
in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access to counsel
and without being charged with any wrongdoing”).
25
Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, supra n. 23, at 532, n. 7.
26
Response of the United States to Request for Precautionary Measures – Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, April 15,
2002, on file with the author.
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specific laws of armed conflict.”27 International human rights law, in the view of the U.S.
government, does not apply at all, being pre-empted by the law of war, in this case the war on
terror. At least one scholar writing on this position asserts unequivocally that it is wrong: “In
time of armed conflict or other emergency, at a minimum states are obliged to protect a ‘core’ of
rights under treaty and customary human right law. . .”28 Another scholar leaves the issue
technically unresolved, but leaning against the United States. Gary Solis, a former military
lawyer, notes the American position, then states: “Many disagree, particularly Europeans, the
ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross], the ICJ [International Court of Justice], and
human rights activists from anywhere.”29 To the extent that international human rights law does
not apply at all in situations of armed conflict, the rights of children would of course be
significantly diminished.

The international law relating to the status and treatment of soldiers and civilians is found
principally in the four Geneva Conventions and their two additional protocols, as well as in other
treaties and customary humanitarian law, all of which seek to make more humane the horror of
war. But the most central issue in the Khadr case arises not from the Geneva Convention texts,
but from an older, customary law norm, that of the combatant’s privilege, which allows
legitimate combatants to kill and wound each other without penalty; what would be a crime in
peacetime is permitted in war.30 One of the most basic yet curious things about the prosecution
of Omar Khadr, and one of the questions most often asked by friends and colleagues alike,
lawyer and non-lawyer, was how Omar could be prosecuted for allegedly killing a soldier during

27

Id., at 21.
HELEN DUFFY, THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 299 (2005).
29
GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 24 (2010)
(footnotes omitted).
30
Id. at 41-42.

28
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battle, where the combatant’s privilege should apply. That would be true, military commission
prosecutors argued, if one were a legitimate combatant, but Omar and his fellow detainees were
first defined as “enemy combatants,” and later, under the Obama administration, as the
aforementioned “alien unprivileged enemy belligerents.” It was originally this designation that
came into controversy as the justification for holding U.S. detainees indefinitely, outside of a war
zone, and subject to “enhanced” interrogation techniques that included repeated waterboarding.
These were not soldiers entitled to POW status, according to the government, but terrorists who
would be “treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity,
in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Convention.”31 That gapping exception
for “military necessity” has created no end of legal problems for both the detainees and
successive presidential administrations in Washington.

Whatever the nuance added by this novel classification, the charge of murder of a U.S.
soldier during combat, as a war crime allegedly committed by an unlawful child combatant – the
basis of the Khadr prosecution – tested its limits.32 Lt. Col. David Frakt, who served as lead
defense counsel in other military commission proceedings and now teaches law, argued
successfully in at least two commission cases that the classification of “enemy combatant” itself
“conflated two different concepts — unprivileged belligerents and war criminals.”33 He argues
that:

31

Brian Tittemore, Guantanamo Bay and the Precautionary Measures of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights: A Case for International Oversight in the Struggle Against Terrorism, 6 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 378, 387 (2006).
32
It is not my primary purpose to focus here on this debate, which has been the subject of whole shelves of law
review articles on the notion of the combatant’s privilege in domestic and international armed conflict. I will instead
focus on more particularly on the issue of the Guantanamo detainees’ ages, something that no international or
domestic tribunal seriously undertook, or undertook and rejected.
33
The two commission cases involved Mohamed Jawad, discussed in this article, and Ali Hamza al Bahlul. David
J.R. Frakt, Faculty website at Berry University, Andreas School of Law, at
http://www.barry.edu/law/future/faculty/dfrakt.htm, visited on January 7, 2012.
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Under Article 4 of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention it is clear that while a
member of an organized resistance movement or militia may be an unprivileged
belligerent (because of not wearing a uniform or failing to carry arms openly, for
example) he may still comply with the laws and customs of war, so not all hostile
acts committed by unprivileged belligerents are war crimes. Attacks by
unprivileged belligerents which comply with the law of war (in that they attack
lawful military targets with lawful weapons) may only be tried in domestic courts.
In Iraq, for example, insurgents who try to kill Americans by implanting roadside
bombs are properly arrested and tried before the Central Criminal Court of Iraq as
common criminals. Attacks by unprivileged belligerents which violate the law of
war, such as attacks on civilians or soldiers attempting to surrender, or using
prohibited weapons like poison gas, can be tried in a war crimes tribunal.34
In her report on the Khadr guilty plea, the NGO activist lawyer Andrea Prasow put it
more succinctly: “It’s a novel legal argument: Merely engaging in battle as an insurgent rather
than a member of the regular army has never made battlefield conduct a war crime.”35 A
definitive review of these charges, however, will never occur. Even had there been such an
appeal, it is not likely to have settled the question.

This unique and novel issue was only one of myriad issues in the context of international
humanitarian law that arose for detainees. Those included the legitimacy of new tribunals created
from whole cloth after 9/11, primarily Combat Status Review Tribunals, which were used to
determine detainee status in Guantanamo, and military commissions with their attendant
appellate review mechanisms or lack thereof. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
found that the military commission scheme set up by the executive branch as of 2006 (and under
which Omar had first been charged), violated one of the core provisions of international
humanitarian law as read through U.S. military law, that of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, which requires “a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
34

David Frakt, New Manual for Military Commissions Disregards the Commander-in-Chief, Congressional Intent
and the Laws of War, Huffington Post, at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-frakt/new-manual-for-militaryc_b_557720.html, April 29, 2010, visited on August 27, 2011.
35
Andrea Prasow, The Child Soldier on Trial at Guantanamo, http: //www.hrw.org/print/news/2010/10/27/childsoldier-trial-guantanamo, Oct. 27, 2010, visited on August 23, 2011.
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which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”36 The message of Hamdan was not
lost on the Bush administration. Although not addressed in that decision, the same Common
Article 3 also extends protection to all persons from “cruel treatment and torture; [and] outrages
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.”37 It was the
mistreatment of detainees, first at Abu Ghraib and then at Guantanamo, that outraged the world
and turned public opinion against Bush-era anti-terrorism policies. More than trials of terrorists,
it was the risk of loss of evidence obtained through torture in court, as well as possible
prosecution of interrogators for their abusive treatment of detainees, that drove the Bush
administration to seek quick passage by a Republican-controlled Congress of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006.

At bottom, international humanitarian law has had little to do with what happens to
detainees at Guantanamo Bay. For a tiny handful of the nearly 800 men there over time, a
conviction by plea or trial has ironically been the key to their release, as will be the case with
Omar Khadr. For another small group, death, by suicide or for other reasons, provided the only
way out. For the vast majority, release by repatriation or transfer to a third country came at the
absolute discretion of the United States government. Such appears to be the case for the
remaining detainees, as not a single court decision ordering the release of a detainee via a habeas
corpus action has resulted in transfer from Guantanamo on those grounds. One can assume,
however, that the nearly 600 transfers carried out by two presidential administrations are in part
the result of the legal pressure asserted by habeas litigation.

36

Hamdan, supra n. 8, at 602. Precisely, the Court found that the Uniform Code of Military Justice, through its
Article 21, had incorporated the common law of war by reference, thus allowing for the application of Common
Article 3.
37
The text of Common Article 3, as its name implies, is shared by all four of the Geneva Conventions.
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B. The Law: Children in Armed Conflict

International law with regard to the rights of children is quite extensive, as will be further
developed below, but comes primarily from two treaty sources that are most relevant here. The
first is the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”). That treaty, which has been ratified
by every country of the world save the United States and Somalia, defines a child as anyone
below the age of 18.38 Two articles of the CRC deal with children in armed conflict. Article 38
calls on states parties to refrain from recruiting children under the age of 15 for military service,
or using children under 15 directly in hostilities. If between 15 and 18, states are called on to
give priority to recruitment of the oldest first. The article explicitly calls on states parties to
“respect and ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian law applicable to [the child] in
armed conflicts.”39 As such, Article 38 is a kind of “hybrid” article: it is “clearly an IHL
provision. Yet formally speaking, Article 38 is part of a human rights instrument.”40 Article 39
states that the parties “shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological
recovery and social reintegration of a child victim” of armed conflict.41 Another article deals
with children deprived of their liberty. Article 37 calls on states parties to keep detained children
separated from adults “unless it is in the child’s best interests not to do so.” It further requires the
right to outside communication with family and to legal assistance.42

This framework is further developed in the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (“Protocol on Child
Soldiers” or “Optional Protocol”). The Optional Protocol, formally ratified by the United States
38

Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 1 (1990).
Id. Art. 38.
40
FIONA ANG, ARTICLE 38: CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT 9 (2005).
41
CRC, supra n. 39, at Art. 39.
42
Id. at Art. 37.
39
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on December 23, 2002, raises the age of recruitment and direct participation of children from 15
to 18, bringing it into line with the broadest definition of a child in the CRC.43 Most importantly
for purposes of the discussion here, the Protocol, in Article 6(3), provides that states parties
“shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons within their jurisdiction recruited or used
in hostilities contrary to the present Protocol are demobilized or otherwise released from service.
States Parties shall, when necessary, accord to such persons all appropriate assistance for their
physical and psychological recovery and their social reintegration.” Article 7(1) further provides
that the states parties “shall cooperate in the implementation of the present Protocol, including in
the prevention of any activity contrary to the Protocol and in the rehabilitation and social
reintegration of persons who are victims of acts contrary to this Protocol.”

Additional international humanitarian law applies to Omar’s situation, most of which
comes not from the four Geneva Conventions, but from Article 77 of Additional Protocol I,
which deals explicitly with situations of children in international armed conflict. Again,
however, the United States has not ratified the additional protocols, which means that most
arguments we made on behalf of children under humanitarian law were made as customary
international law.44 Moreover, Article 77 uses “under 15” language in referring to children,
which is not helpful to Omar Khadr, who was captured at age 15. Many activists push for what is

43

The United States, which permits enlistment in military service at age 17 under some circumstances, has taken
reservations to this portion of the treaty.
44
Excellent discussion of the obligations to children under humanitarian law can be found in documents such as
Maria Teresa Dutli, Captured Child Combatants, 278 International Review of the Red Cross 421, 31 October 1990;
R.K. Dixit, Special Protection of Children During Armed Conflicts Under the Geneva Conventions Regime, 1 ISIL
Y’Book Int’l Humanitarian & Ref. L. 12 (2001), available at
http://www.worldlii.org/int/journals/ISILYBIHRL/2001/2.html, visited on December 28, 2011, and an excellent
text, MATTHEW HAPPOLD, CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
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called the “Straight 18” position, which would bar recruitment or use of all child soldiers under
age 18, and “international law’s trend-line arcs toward the Straight 18 horizon.”45

Two well-known and respected sets of non-binding principles also apply to children in
situations of armed conflict, the Cape Town Principles of 1997, and a sequel, the Paris Principles
of 2007.46 Finally, although not explicitly related to children in armed conflict, the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked concepts from neuroscience on the cognitive
development of children in decisions mitigating punishment and protecting the rights of children,
including the decision excerpted in the heading to this article.47 Those decisions employ the same
underlying rationale regarding the reasons not to hold juvenile soldiers to the same standards as
adults.

C. Other Children in US Detention at Guantanamo and Elsewhere

The exact number of children detained at Guantanamo has yet to be fully clarified. Totals
have ranged from as few as six to over 60 – the former number from the government and the
latter from the activist world.48 The most reliable count appears to be that compiled by journalist
Andy Worthington, who documents 28 juvenile detainees at Guantanamo based on materials
posted to Wikileaks. The Worthington data show that most of the youthful detainees were
45

Drumbl, supra n. 4, at 11. Mention African Charter on Rights and Welfare of the Child.
UNICEF, Cape Town Principles and Best Practices, 27-30 April 1997; Principles and Guidelines on Children
Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (The Paris Principles), February 2007.
47
The decision in J.D.B., id., goes on to state the basic premise of cognitive science on which the Court has relied to
provide relief for juveniles under 18 years of age from the death penalty, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005);
life imprisonment without parole, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); and J.D.B. The Court invokes
Blackstone in recognizing this rubric of science: “The law has historically reflected the same assumption that
children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to
understand the world around them.” J.D.B. id, at 2403. That rubric, in turn, underlies the rationale of the Optional
Protocol on Child Soldiers, discussed herein. See generally, Jay D. Aronson, Neuroscience and Juvenile Justice, 42
Akron L. Rev. 917 (2009).
48
Melissa A. Jamison, Sins of the Father: Punishing Children in the War on Terror, 29 U. La Verne L. Rev. 88, 99,
n. 70 (2008).

46

17

Draft of January 9, 2012
transferred back to their home countries. One juvenile detainee died at Guantanamo “under
mysterious circumstances” suggestive of suicide, and two, other than Omar Khadr, have been the
subject of judicial proceedings described in more detail below.49

In 2003, there was a storm of controversy and publicity over the discovery that there were
at least three children on the base. Omar Khadr was not included in that count.50 The press
conference with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, excerpted in a headnote to this article,
arose in the wake of that discovery. The children in question, thought to be between 13 and 15,
were quickly removed from the adult population and relocated to Camp Iguana, part of the
detention complex of buildings, where they enjoyed relative freedom and more comfortable
conditions pending their transfer home. The boys were quietly returned to their homes in
Afghanistan in early 2004.51 The extensive attention by the media to the detention of children, as
well as the after-the-fact hushed responses by the government, infer that officials knew that the
detention of children at all, let alone with adults, was improper, if not illegal.
Two judicial resolutions other than the Khadr case, one from the federal courts and one
from a military commission, dealt with juveniles held at Guantanamo. The first, El Gharani v.
Bush,52 was quite simple and straightforward. Mohammed el Gharani, a native of Saudi Arabia
and citizen of Chad, was captured by Pakistanis and turned over to the U.S. in early 2002. El
Gharani sought his release via habeas corpus petition to U.S. District Court judge Richard Leon.
Age was not a factor in Judge Leon’s decision to order el Gharani’s release, which turned on the
49

Andy Worthington, WikiLeaks and the 22 Children of Guantanamo, at
http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2011/06/11/wikileaks-and-the-22-children-of-guantanamo/, visited on January 8,
2012. The child who died was Yasser Talal al-Zahrani, age 17 at detention, number 16 on Worthington’s list.
50
These stories are summarized in Melissa Jamison, Detention of Juvenile Enemy Combatants at Guantanamo Bay:
The Special Concerns of Children, 9 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol’y 127 (2005), at text accompanying notes 38-55.
51
Guantanamo Youngest Inmates Home, BBC News, Feb. 2, 2004, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3450687.stm, visited on December 6, 2011.
52
593 F.Supp.2d 144 (D.D.C. 2009).

18

Draft of January 9, 2012
sufficiency of the government’s evidence. The only mention of juvenile status at the time of
capture came in a single line of the decision, stating that the petitioner “claims to have traveled to
Pakistan from Saudi Arabia at the age of 14 to escape discrimination against Chadians in that
country.”53 Age may have played a role in the judge’s analysis, but not on the record. The boy
was released from Guantanamo in June of 2009.54
Such was not the case with the other decision, which involved a detainee named
Mohamed Jawad. Jawad was arrested in 2002 for allegedly throwing a hand grenade into a
vehicle carrying two U.S. military personnel and their interpreter in Afghanistan, resulting in
serious injuries to all. While his exact age at the time of his arrest is unclear, the government
admitted he was under 18 years old at the time of his arrest. During interrogation by Afghan
officials following his arrest, he was told that he and his family would be killed if he didn’t
confess. He confessed to the crime and was turned over to the U.S. military, which transferred
him to Guantanamo and charged him with various crimes to be tried by military commission.55
The presiding officer denied a motion to dismiss charges based on the accused’s status as a child
soldier, but that motion was grounded almost entirely in domestic law.56 The presiding officer
did, however, grant a motion to suppress Jawad’s statements to Afghan authorities, finding the

53

Id, at p.4 of non-paginated slip opinion.
Chad Man Released from Guantanamo, BBC News, 12 June 2009, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr//2/hi/africa/8096402.stm, visited on December 27, 2011.
55
Interestingly, the government noted in its pleadings that Jawad and Omar Khadr were “the only two individuals
captured when they were under the age of 18,” a curious claim given the information on the number of juveniles
found to be detained at Guantanamo. United States v. Jawad, D-022 Ruling on Defense Motion to Suppress Out-ofCourt Statements of the Accused to Afghan Authorities, 28 Oct. 2008, at n. 1, available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/d20081104JawadD022Suppress.pdf, visited on Dec. 6, 2011.
56
United States v. Jawad, D-012, Ruling on Defense Motion to Dismiss – Lack of Personal Jurisdiction: Child
Soldier, 24 Sept. 2008. This was after the decision in the Khadr case, discussed below at Section III. Interestingly,
the presiding officer, in deciding the issue on international law grounds, invoked as authority the U.S. response to
questions asked by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, wherein, he asserted, the government responded that
“under international law, persons under 18 years of age can be prosecuted for law of war violations.” Id. at 4
(emphasis in original). This is an interesting case of the executive branch being invoked by a military tribunal as a
legal source for the interpretation of international law obligations.
54
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threat to kill his family “credible,” and further concluding that that the threats and intimidation
amounted to torture, given “the Accused’s age and the then reputation of the Afghan police as
corrupt and violent.”57 Undeterred, the government determined to proceed with the case, only to
lose a challenge to Jawad’s detention via habeas corpus in the federal district court of
Washington, D.C.58 Charges against Jawad eventually were dropped, and he was repatriated to
Afghanistan in August of 2009.59 Age played a clear role in the decision by the presiding officer
to suppress Jawad’s statements; there is little doubt that age played a role in Mohamed Jawad’s
success in pursuing habeas corpus relief, as well as in his eventual release. Skirmishing in the
case over disclosure of favorable evidence to the defense gave rise to the resignation of the chief
military prosecutor, Lt. Col. Darrell L. Vandeveld, whose eloquent statement is excerpted as
another headnote to this paper.60
The U.S. detention of juveniles in armed conflicts is not unique to Guantanamo. In
answer to a written question from the Committee on the Rights of the Child in June of 2008
about how many juveniles were detained at Guantanamo and other US detention facilities, the
government responded that it “does not currently detain any juveniles at Guantanamo Bay;” that

57

Ibid. Jawad’s lawyers also filed a motion for dismissal of charges based on lack of jurisdiction over juveniles,
modeled on the Khadr motions discussed herein, which was denied, just as it had been earlier in the Khadr military
commission proceedings.
58
Judge Huvelle’s terse ruling can be found at Bacha v. Obama, No. 05-2385, 2009 WL 2365846, (ESH) (D.D.C.
July 30, 2009). Andy Worthington, an investigative journalist, examined the Jawad proceedings more closely, noting
Judge Huvelle’s withering questioning of the government in the Jawad hearing. Among her various attacks on the
government, Judge Huvelle charged that “This guy has been there seven years, seven years. He might have been
taken there at the age of 12, 13, 14, 15 years old. I don’t know what he is doing there.” Andy Worthington, How
Judge Huvelle Humiliated the Government in Guantanamo Case, at
http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2009/07/31/how-judge-huvelle-humiliated-the-government-in-guantanamo-case/
(July 31, 2009).
59
Jonathan S. Landay & Carol Rosenberg, Young Afghan Freed: Spent 6 ½ Years at Guantanamo, Miami Herald,
Aug. 24, 2009.
60
Andy Worthington, Former Guantanamo Prosecutor Condemns “Chaotic” Trials in Case of Teenage Torture
Victim, at http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2009/01/14/former-guantanamo-prosecutor-condemns-chaotic-trialsin-case-of-teenage-torture-victim/ (Jan. 14, 2009), visited on Dec. 6, 2011.
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it had held 90 juveniles in Afghanistan (10 currently); and that it had held approximately 2,400
juveniles in Iraq (500 currently).61
D. Children as Defendants in War Crimes Trials in History62
Many statements were made in the media and elsewhere, in the pre-trial stages of the
Khadr commission proceedings, regarding the historical record of trials of children for war
crimes. Most typical were dramatic assertions that Omar’s trial would be the first such trial in
modern history, or since World War II, or ever.63 This brief subsection includes information on
the detention or trials of children in armed conflict in history, and refutes the contentions
regarding the unprecedented nature of the Khadr trial while affirming that no prior history
justifies U.S. judicial action against Omar Khadr.
Children have been a part of armed conflicts throughout much of American history
before the Twentieth Century. Regulations of the U.S. Army in 1813 specified that “healthy,
active boys between the ages of 14 and 18 could be enlisted as musicians with parental

61

United Nations, Committee on the Rights of the Child, Written Replies by the Government of the United States of
American Concerning the List of Issues (CRC/C/OPAC/USA/Q1) to be Taken Up in Connection with the
Consideration of the Initial Report of the United States of America Under Article 8, Paragraph 1, of the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict
(CRC/C/OPAC/USA/1), CRC/C/OPAC/Q1/Add.1/Rev.1, 2 June 2008, at ¶¶ 29-31.
62
I am grateful to Prof. Deena Hurwitz and her students at the University of Virginia School of Law for their
research on the historic prosecutions of children involved in armed conflict, and particularly for war crimes. The
research was done during the 2005-06 school year as part of our representation of Omar Khadr. Most of the citations
in this section come from that research.
63
United Nations, Special Representative of the Secretary General on Children in Armed Conflict, Statement on the
Occasion of the Trial of Omar Khadr Before the Guantanamo Military Commission, 10 August 2010 (“Since World
War II, no child has been prosecuted for a war crime.”); Human Rights Watch, Remarks to a Pre-Sessional Meeting
of the Committee on the Rights of the Child Regarding U.S. Compliance with the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 7 Feb. 2008 (“Khadr will
be the first person in recent years to be tried by a western nation for alleged war crimes committed as a child.”);
GUANTANAMO’S CHILD, supra n. 14, at back cover leaf (“the youngest defendant ever to be tried for war crimes”);
Matthew Happold, Child Soldiers: Victims or Perpetrators, 29 La Verne L. Rev. 56, 84 (2008) (“No child soldier has
appeared before an international tribunal.”).
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consent.”64 Boy soldiers served as musicians, cooks, messengers, porters, spies, and sometimes
as fighters during the U.S. Civil War, where boys in uniform ranged in age from 8 to 16.65 Boys
of 14 and above were routinely permitted to serve or actively recruited into the Confederate
army, particularly as the war ground on into 1864 and the South’s position became more
desparate.66 Some children were detained as prisoners of war on both sides. One well-known boy
prisoner of 13 or 14 at Andersonville, the South’s most infamous prison, was called “Red Cap”
and became a personal aide to the camp’s commander, Henry Wirz.67 In prisons of the North,
such as Fort Delaware, boys of 16 foraged for food, contracted measles, and sometimes died of
congestion of the lungs and other diseases.68 Legal actions occasionally involved these boys, but
not for their prosecution; habeas corpus applications “inundated” the courts, filed by parents
seeking to gain the release of their sons from military service.69
In the American west during the Civil War, a military commission tried nearly 400
Dakota Indians for their actions against white settlers in Minnesota. Carol Chomsky documents
these trials,70 while another scholar of the commission proceedings records the trial and
conviction of several Dakota Indian boys between 14 and 18; at least one fourteen-year-old boy
was hanged.71 The trial of Wowinape, a boy of 16, was one of the most curious. He was
convicted by the commission and sentenced to hang, but his sentence was later overturned by a

64

DENNIS M. KEESEE, TOO YOUNG TO DIE: BOY SOLDIERS OF THE UNION ARMY, 1861-1865, 7 (2001).
Id. at 6.
66
EDMUND L. DRAGO, CONFEDERATE PHOENIX: REBEL CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES IN SOUTH CAROLINA 15
(2008)
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Keesee, supra n. 65, at 152-153.
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Drago, supra n. 67, at 22-23.
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Keesee, supra n. 65, at 80.
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Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Injustice, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 13 (1990).
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MARION P. SATTERLEE, A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE MASSACRE BY THE DAKOTA INDIANS OF MINNESOTA IN
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superior officer. Prof. Chomsky suggests that the overturning of the sentence may well have had
to do with Wowinape’s age and the fact that he “had done no more than fight in battles.”72
Children were the subjects of war-time trials in World War II, although the evidence as to
whether these were trials for war crimes is ambiguous. While some partisans fighting in Europe
were children, young boys became part of the fighting forces of Germany, particularly in the
Hitler Youth and Volkssturm, literally People’s Storm, a militia that drafted children as young as
ten during 1945, the last year of the war.73 Starting in January of 1943, anti-aircraft batteries
were manned by Hitler Youth of fifteen.74 One Hitler Youth operation involved dropping boy
suicide commandos behind enemy lines in occupied Germany to reverse Allied gains there. Two
“Werewolves,” as they were known, were captured behind American lines. Heinz Petry, sixteen,
and Josef Schörner, seventeen, were tried as spies by the American troops, condemned to death
and executed.75
During Guantanamo commission proceedings on the motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction over juveniles, to be fully discussed below, the defense asserted in its motion that
“no international tribunal established under the laws of war, from Nuremberg forward, has ever
prosecuted former child soldiers as war criminals.”76 The prosecution responded by citing three
cases purporting to prosecute children for war crimes during or after World War II.77 The
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Chomsky, supra n. 71, at 46, n. 200.
GERHARD REMPEL, HITLER’S CHILDREN: THE HITLER YOUTH AND THE SS, 233(1989).
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United States v. Khadr (Military Commission), D-22, Defense Motion for Dismissal Due to Lack of Jurisdiction
Under the MCA in Regard to Juvenile Crimes of a Chid Soldier, 18 January 2008, at ¶ 5.
77
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Due to Lack of Jurisdiction Under the MCA in Regard to Juvenile Crimes of a Child Soldier, 25 January 2008, at
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prosecution asserted that in Trial of Johannes Oenning & Emil Nix,78 a British Military Court in
Borken, Germany prosecuted Oenning, said to be a 15-year-old member of the Hitler Youth, for
his involvement in the murder of a Royal Air Force Officer. And in Trial of Alois & Anna
Bommer & and Their Daughters,79 the Permanent Military Tribunal at Metz, Germany tried two
daughters under 18, convicted with another sister and their parents for war crimes. The two were
convicted and imprisoned. Finally, the prosecution referred to an article citing the war crimes
trial of Josef Kramer and others, known as the Belsen Case. There, one of the accused was said
to be Antoni Aurdzieg, “as young as 16 at the time of his vicious offenses.”80
The defense responded that a trial transcript in the Belson case showed that Aurdzieg was
20 years old, not 16; that the two Bommer daughters and their remaining family were tried under
the French Penal Code; and that Oenning was tried by a British occupation commission, not a
law-of-war commission, as with Omar Khadr.81 They might also have noted that all of these
proceedings took place before adoption of the now-universally respected Geneva Conventions
regime. The presiding judge made no mention of any of these historic cases in his decision on the
defense motion.82
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There is, however, one troubling modern case that was not mentioned in the Khadr
litigation or anywhere else, to the best of the author’s knowledge. It involves the trial and
conviction of a boy of 14 at the time of his offenses by a special UN-administered court in East
Timor. In 2000, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) created the
Special Court for East Timor, Indonesia, which heard cases brought by the Serious Crimes Unit
(SCU) against persons responsible for crimes against humanity and other serious crimes
committed in East Timor. The Special Court’s composition was one Timorese and two
international judges.83 The Rules of Procedure of the tribunals allowed the prosecution of minors
between 12 and 16 years of age, if done in accordance with special rules relating to juvenile
justice.84
A young boy identified in the file only as “X” to protect his privacy and reputation, was
arrested in October 2001, and was later charged by indictment from the SCU with extermination
and attempted extermination, both crimes against humanity under the terms of the Special
Tribunal. The facts, though somewhat scant, indicate that X made a statement to police that he
had been forced to join a militia in September of 1999 at age 14. He had traveled with the militia
into West Timor, where they found 75 young men tied up as prisoners. After a forced march of
the prisoners, supervised by adult leaders of the militia, he was ordered to kill three prisoners and
beaten when he did not comply promptly. He admitted to having killed three men with a
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United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, Regulation No. 2000/15, On the Establishment of
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United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, Regulation No. 2000/30, on Transitional Rules of
Criminal Procedure, UNTAET/REG/2000/30, 25 September 2000, at Section 45. It does not appear that any
subsequent special rules were developed.

25

Draft of January 9, 2012
machete; 47 men in total were killed by the militia that night. After these events, X left and went
home.85
The record of case indicates that X pleaded guilty to murder “in violation of article 338 of
the Indonesian Penal Code” in October 2002.86 X was later sentenced to 12 months
imprisonment, with credit for 11 months served in pretrial confinement, and the remaining
month suspended.87 The report on the trial notes the lenience of the panel, showing that “it had
taken into account not only the age of the accused but also the fact the accused did not act out of
his/her own initiative.”88 The actual judgment in the case also notes action on superior orders, no
prior criminal record, and the plea of guilty as mitigating factors. It is clearer from the judgment
text itself that the charge to which X pleaded guilty was the domestic crime of manslaughter, a
lesser degree of homicide than murder, with a less harsh punishment range. 89 From October of
2002 on, the boy was released from custody so that he might attend school.90 The case is
troubling because it was conducted quite recently, and under the auspices of the UN, which
purportedly seeks to limit the prosecution of minors. Moreover, the original charge was crimes
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against humanity, an international crime. On the other hand, the sentence imposed recognizes the
age of the accused, and is for a common crime in domestic law, not a war crime.
Suffice it to say that from World War II on, war crimes trials of juveniles were and are
certainly the rare exception, particularly given the estimated numbers of child soldiers
worldwide. In the Sierra Leone Special Tribunal, the chief prosecutor announced that he would
not prosecute juveniles.91 In the Statute of the International Criminal Court, no one under 18
years of age can be prosecuted at all.92 And in 2006, a UN Special Rapporteur of the SubCommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights recommended that “in no case . .
. should minors [under the age of 18] be placed under the jurisdiction of military courts.”93 The
historical trend is away from the prosecution of children in armed conflict. Countries that honor
the spirit of the Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers will not prosecute children under 18, or will
prosecute with protections commensurate with international norms of juvenile justice, taking into
account the age of the alleged offender.
II.

Omar Khadr as a child in the federal courts: habeas corpus challenges

In June of 2004, the United States Supreme Court held, in Rasul v. Bush,94 that the
federal courts had jurisdiction to hear the claims of detainees at Guantanamo Bay via the writ of
habeas corpus, and that venue would lie in Washington, D.C. Within days of that decision, I
requested a case from the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), a dynamic non-governmental
group in New York that had been collecting claims from the families of detainees. I was joined
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in representation by another clinical faculty colleague, with plans that we would manage the case
as part of our docket in the International Human Rights Law Clinic. CCR happily assigned us the
Omar Khadr case, to be handled on a purely pro bono basis, but with coordination and back-up
to be provided by CCR staff.95
Nothing in the litigation of the federal district court claims by detainees was easy; the
government, through both the Department of Justice and the Pentagon, fought against access to
the courts for the detainees and their lawyers on every conceivable issue, every step of the way.
One initial administrative step was the government’s effort to consolidate the pending habeas
cases, then only eleven, for disposition of common issues. That effort was successful, although
individual district court judges had the authority either to pull their cases off of the common
docket for their own disposition, or to hear individual petitions for relief on discreet issues. Our
team therefor proceeded on two fronts in federal court, one chosen and one mandated: we chose
to litigate two matters before our assigned judge, the Honorable John Bates, while our common
claims were heard, on common briefing, by the Honorable Joyce Hens Green, who stepped out
of senior status to hear this single matter.
Almost immediately after our assignment of the case, I began research on the issue of
children in armed conflict, with particular focus on two treaties ratified by the United States and
95
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immediately enforceable obligations arising under those treaties: the Optional Protocol on Child
Soldiers and the International Labor Organization’s Convention 182, Concerning the Prohibition
and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (hereafter “ILO
Convention 182” or “Child Labor Convention”). Among the many issues that we prepared to
litigate that fall, the issue of Omar’s status as a child in armed conflict was high on the list. Our
amended petition for relief through habeas corpus incorporated both a first allegation regarding
the absence of jurisdiction in Guantanamo over minors, as well as an allegation that Omar’s
detention was unlawful and arbitrary under international humanitarian and human rights law
protecting juveniles.96 However, the opportunities for raising such claims, we soon discovered,
were often overshadowed by broader or seemingly more urgent issues.
Judge Green’s consolidated case gave us one of the earliest opportunities to hear the
government’s position on Omar’s status as a child. The judge ordered a large pre-hearing
conference meeting of all counsel in her chambers in late August of 2004, within weeks after the
consolidation order. At that meeting, we noted that our client was a child, detained at age 15.
Judge Green professed surprise to hear this and asked the government to provide her with
information regarding the situation of minors at Guantanamo and any steps to provide them with
special accommodations. We followed up with a letter to government counsel that day, and
received their reply on September 3, 2004.97 The letter indicated that as of that date, “no
detainees known to be younger than age 16 are detained at Guantanamo Bay,” a statement
crafted to focus on current age rather than age at the time of initial capture or detention. The
letter also said that the government’s policy was to provide special treatment of detainees under
96
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the age of 16 at the time of their arrival, pointing to the three Afghan juveniles who had been
moved into the comforts of Camp Iguana and later released after the international press
discovered their presence there. Again, however, the letter failed to note that detainees 16 and up
were treated as adults for purposes of status and treatment, particularly for protracted and
“enhanced” interrogations. Moreover, the letter ironically referred only to international law to
defend government policy, while the government pursued an aggressive posture of barring the
detainees themselves from invoking humanitarian law for their defense. The letter stated that
“the law of armed conflict does not define with precision the age at which a combatant is
considered a child or adult. Generally accepted norms in the field,” it went on to say, “including
the Geneva Conventions and other international protocols to which the United States is a party,
while not specifically addressing the issue of combatants who are minors, recognize that during a
time of war civilians and individuals under the age of 15 are accorded different treatment that
persons who are older.” We responded immediately to their letter on each of these issues,
pointing out that the government had implied recognition of its ratification of the Protocol on
Child Soldiers, which Congress explicitly made self-executing,98 and that the Protocol made
rehabilitation and reintegration into society of children in armed conflict the primary purpose of
that instrument.99 Similarly, ILO Convention 182, also self-executing, in its Article 4, condemns
“the forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict” as a form of forced
labor.
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We received no response from the court to this exchange of correspondence. We
attempted to raise the issue of Omar’s status as a child in armed conflict again in briefing on the
issue of the government’s motion to dismiss all detainee claims. Unfortunately, however, our one
child’s claims were overwhelmed by the common claims of all of the detainees jointly, which
were briefed with a specific page limit. Our reiterated claims under the Protocol and ILO
Convention 182 were relegated to a single footnote in the section arguing that international law
claims could be vindicated by habeas corpus.100
Judge Green’s decision in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases,101 on January 31, 2004,
which generally upheld the detainee’s right to proceed on habeas corpus grounds, made national
and international news, and eventually, after winding, protracted appeals and joinder of cases,
became the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2006 ruling in Boumediene v. Bush.102 With this generally
good news from Judge Green, however, came bad news for Omar Khadr. First, Judge Green
almost immediately imposed a stay regarding any further action by the detainees during the
protracted process of appellate review of her decision.103 Moreover, her decision itself, in a littlenoted paragraph toward the end of a long opinion, dismissed without discussion “the remaining
treaty-based claims” other than her narrow holding with regard to the application of the Geneva
Conventions, and declined to reach claims under customary international law, as “unnecessary . .
. to resolve the petitioners’ claims.”104 We were denied a forum to reach the issue of Omar’s
status as a child in armed conflict.
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During those early stages of the litigation, and despite the stay, we pursued two separate
claims for relief on Omar’s behalf under habeas jurisdiction, filed before District Judge John
Bates. Both proceeded as cases involving minors, thus using Omar’s initials “O.K.” as his only
designation in court filings, despite widespread and growing attention to his case in the media.
Both were decided against us, and no appeals were pursued. The first, a motion for emergency
medical access and for production of medical records, was filed on August 10, 2004.105 Though
cast as “emergency,” the motion lingered on the judge’s docket more than two months, and was
resolved against Omar in a decision which addressed itself largely to issues of his mental
competence to stand trial, an issue we had neither raised nor briefed.106 At the end of the
decision, Judge Bates wrote that the case may be read to raise a “broader and more sweeping
claim,” one regarding the court’s “affirmative responsibility to ensure the physical and mental
well-being of petitioner, in light of his status as a minor, his serious physical injuries, [and] the
views of many that conditions at Guantanamo are too harsh (and inappropriate for juveniles).”
While we had focused heavily on Omar’s status as a minor as a factor justifying judicial
intervention for his protection, we had not raised the claim in those broad terms. The court
nonetheless rejected those arguments as well, expressing a reluctance to “second-guess the
medical treatment provided to prisoners by government officials.”107 Finally, in perhaps its most
disingenuous ruling, the court found that whatever relief might have been justified when he was
a child, petitioner was now an adult “seeking only prospective relief in the form of medical
assessment.”108 That reasoning ignored the simple fact that no detainee had access to counsel or
the courts for up to three years, and that fact-gathering in Guantanamo occurred in the most
105
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onerous conditions for counsel and client. If Omar was an adult, it was because of the
government’s vigorous efforts to deter advocacy on his behalf.
A second action was filed in March of 2005, originally seeking injunctive relief to
prevent ongoing torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment during interrogations,
and later amended by a similar claim seeking to prevent Omar’s possible rendition from
Guantanamo to another country without judicial approval.109 This action faced an additional
hurdle due to the existence of Judge Green’s stay in the case; it sought to lift the stay due to
extraordinary circumstances. It too failed. Again, we did not explicitly challenge Omar’s status
as a juvenile in that proceeding. We did invoke provisions of the Convention against Torture,
which the U.S. had ratified and implemented,110 as well as those of Article 77(1) of Protocol 1 to
the Geneva Conventions, which provides that “[c]hildren shall be the object of special respect
and shall be protected against any form of indecent assault. The Parties to the conflict shall
provide them with the care and aid they require, whether because of their age or for any other
reason.”111
In a July decision that year, Judge Bates again rejected our arguments seeking
intervention, concluding that we had shown no real and immediate threat of future mistreatment
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similar to that which had occurred previously.112 The ruling was conspicuously devoid of any
mention of or reliance on international law. The court found that “the fact that the petitioner was
a minor when many of the alleged incidents occurred does not change this analysis. His status as
a minor does not make the allegations of mistreatment any more likely to occur again in the
future.” The court also reiterated his earlier holding that because relief was prospective only and
thus not available to Omar as an adult. 113
Judge Bates was to have one more opportunity to directly address the issue of Omar’s
status as a child affected by armed conflict, although not during our representation of him.
Omar’s newly appointed military lawyers simultaneously sought to dismiss charges before a
reconstituted military commission on grounds of Omar’s juvenile status while also seeking to
enjoin those proceedings in the federal court habeas process, on grounds that his trial was barred
as a juvenile, or alternatively that he be transferred from adult to juvenile detention and placed in
an appropriate rehabilitation and reintegration program.114 Once again, Omar’s team failed to
persuade Judge Bates, although this time he avoided the questions rather than answering them
adversely the petitioner.
Omar’s team made three arguments.115 First, they argued that the Military Commissions
Act of 2006, enacted quickly by Congress after the U.S. Supreme Court’s Hamdan decision, did
not confer personal jurisdiction for the trial of juveniles. Second, they argued that Omar’s
designation as an “enemy combatant” was inconsistent with U.S. and international law, as a child
cannot be a “member” “affiliate” or “associate” of an armed group. Third, they argued that even
if his detention was lawful, the law of war required that Omar be placed in a rehabilitation and
112
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reintegration program appropriate for former child soldiers. The last claim was grounded
primarily in the language of the Protocol on Child Soldiers.
Judge Bates largely adopted the arguments of the government; he abstained on the first
two questions and found that he was statutorily prohibited from deciding the third. He found that
the pending proceedings in a military commission had priority over his review of the first two
issues, and that those remedies must be exhausted before he could validly consider them.116 As to
the third issue, he found that he had no jurisdiction to hear such claims, pursuant to provisions of
the Military Commissions Act that barred review by the courts.117 This last conclusion seems the
most problematic. While the court found that this request “comes closer to the heart of the writ
than does a request for a blanket or a mattress,” it still essentially constituted an “on base transfer
to a less restrictive detention facility.”118 When characterized as a challenge to conditions of
confinement, the claim fell within the ambit of a provision of the new law that barred federal
courts from review of such claims. Moreover, the court’s invocation of a “conditions of
confinement” neatly allowed it to avoid any issue of treaty interpretation or, more generally, of
international law at all.
If a claim for transfer into rehabilitation under the Protocol on Child Soldiers constitutes
a mere claim for change of conditions of confinement, the treaty is rendered ineffectual to
accomplish a core provision. Treatment of juveniles within the U.S. legal system provides a
useful analogy. If a crime is committed by a minor, whatever the state or federal law defining the
age for such persons, the child is treated as a juvenile offender, subject to an entirely different
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regime of adjudication and punishment.119 While the child may be transferred into adult
jurisdiction, that transfer requires a judicial determination changing the status of the minor from
child to adult for purposes of jurisdiction.120 Thus, a transfer from juvenile to adult confinement
is not only a change in conditions but a change in status; it is the nature of the claimant, not the
nature of the claim that defines the transition. The same should have been true in the
determination to treat Omar Khadr as a juvenile for purposes of the Protocol. In any event, no
appeal was taken from the decision of the district court. But Omar Khadr’s long saga for
vindication of his rights as a child was not over. He also raised such claims in military
commission proceedings.
III.

Omar Khadr as a child in military commission proceedings: pre-trial issues

Military commission proceedings fundamentally change the posture of the claimant of
rights. The claim in habeas corpus proceedings is governed by civil rules, with lesser burdens of
proof for the government to justify ongoing detention, while military commission proceedings
are criminal in nature, and the accused should enjoy all the rights of a defendant such as the
presumption of innocence and the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the prosecution.
However, as established at Guantanamo, these specialized military tribunals were explicitly
designed to make it easier for the government to convict, and very hard for the defendant to
invoke the normal guarantees of due process and fair trial.121 Such failures are exactly what led
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the United States Supreme Court, in the Hamdan decision, to strike down the commission system
as fatally flawed.
My faculty colleague and I, having represented Omar in federal court, continued to
represent him as civilian counsel when he was charged, in November of 2005, by the first
military commission, put into place by presidential order of George W. Bush.122 Under the rules
of the commission as then constituted, all other actors in the proceedings – prosecution, judge
and jury – were regular military personnel. The rules therefore required that, unlike courts
martial, the accused was required to be represented by military lawyers; civilian lawyers were
optional at the election of the accused. Omar was provided with two such lawyers, who
collaborated with us until all commission proceedings were suspended after the Supreme Court
heard oral arguments in the Hamdan case in the spring of 2006.
The pre-trial proceedings in the first military commission process were abbreviated,
lasting only a matter of months in our case before being stayed, but they merit mention for the
claims raised relating to the issue of children in armed conflict. Our defense team filed some 45
pre-trial motions challenging the jurisdiction or process of the commissions; some were broad
and some very narrow. The prosecution responded to those motions, but no hearing was ever
held on their merits; the commissions were struck down before a decision by the presiding
officer. Four defense motions, 32 through 35, dealt with the issues of children in armed conflict
charged with war crimes. The simplest was Motion 35, which called for use of the initials of the
accused only, given his youth at the time of the offenses. The motion would have been largely
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ineffectual, given the storm of media focus on any military commission proceedings at that time,
and Omar Khadr’s name had been spread worldwide because of that enormous publicity.
Motions 32 and 33 were similar in their challenges; 32 called for dismissal of the charges
based on failure of commission procedures to provide for defenses or sentencing procedures for
juveniles under age 18 at the time of their offenses, while 33 called for dismissal based on failure
to prosecute Omar as a child at the time of his alleged offenses. Omar was 19 years old at the
time of the motions. The arguments were grounded first in international human rights law. The
U.S. had ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and had
signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which obligated the United States, at
the very least, not to violate the object and purpose of the treaty, and arguably created obligations
under customary international law,123 particularly because the U.S. had ratified the Optional
Protocol on Child Soldiers. Both the ICCPR and CRC required special treatment for juveniles in
general, and especially during criminal proceedings, where the goal of any adjudicatory process
was to be rehabilitation and the best interests of the child. The complete failure of military
commission procedures to acknowledge the special needs of juveniles made them fatally flawed
regarding any child charged there.
The prosecution responded, in essence, that no international instrument prohibits the
government from holding someone criminally responsible for war crimes solely because he was
15 years old at the time of the offense in question. It further argued, as had the U.S. government
123
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in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, that international human rights law does
not apply during armed conflict and the more specific lex specialis of international humanitarian
law takes over completely.124
Motion 35 argued for dismissal on grounds that the commission process failed to meet
obligations to decommission, rehabilitate and reintegrate Omar into society, as a former child
solder. Here, for the first time in the commission process, we argued the Protocol on Child
Soldiers and ILO Convention 182 together with other international standards such as the Beijing
Rules, the Tokyo Rules, and the Guidelines for Action on Children in the Criminal Justice
System. We also invoked Article 78 of Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions, arguing that Omar
was not properly evacuated from the conflict zone in which he was captured. The prosecution’s
argument can be summarized in a single sentence: none of the treaties or standards bar the
United States from trying a 15 year old for war crimes. They argued that the instruments
invoked, save the Protocol on Child Soldiers, were either non-binding or not treaties to which the
U.S. was a party. The Protocol, they argued, did not prohibit prosecution of 15-year-olds.
The Protocol on Child Soldiers, in its Article 6(3), provides that states parties “shall take
all feasible measures to ensure that persons within their jurisdiction recruited or used in
hostilities contrary to this Protocol are demobilized or otherwise released from service.” It goes
on to require social reintegration for such persons. Two aspects of the Protocol are highlighted
here: first, the obligations are mandatory (“shall”), not precatory; second, demobilization and
reintegration are required when a child is under the physical control of the capturing state
(“within their jurisdiction”). Article 7(1) again requires states to cooperate in implementation of
the treaty: “States Parties shall cooperate in the implementation of the treaty, including . . . in the
124
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rehabilitation and social reintegration of persons who are victims of acts contrary to this
protocol.” The remainder of the treaty’s operative provisions refer only to persons under 18 years
of age. There is no mention of trials for 15-year-old juveniles in the treaty, but the Protocol does
contain language twice calling for measures to protect any juvenile “victim” under 18 and “used
in hostilities” other than by trial; that is by rehabilitation and reintegration. But that issue, too,
was left without resolution in the commission, which was struck down in its entirety in June.
The issue of jurisdiction over children was finally settled for the military commission
process by a ruling in April of 2008 on a defense motion arguing that the Military Commissions
Act of 2006 (hereafter “MCA”) failed to provide jurisdiction for the trial of juvenile crimes by a
child soldier.125 By this point in the commission process, the Khadr case had attracted heavy
international attention, and amicus briefs were filed on his behalf by three groups of lawmakers,
scholars and non-governmental organizations.126 All were admitted and considered by the
presiding officer. The defense raised three arguments. First, Omar’s team argued that neither the
MCA nor any other military law extends to those who do not have lawful military status, and
children under 18, under U.S. law, are incapable of obtaining such lawful status. As authority,
the defense invoked domestic cases barring the military enlistment of minors under 18, who
could never attain status as a member of the military. This argument was easily brushed aside, as
the MCA refers to “persons” while the Uniform Code of Military Justice refers to “members of
the armed forces.” As such, the presiding officer reasoned, decisions under the UCMJ have no
relevance to commission proceedings. A second argument related to the application of the
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federal Juvenile Detention Act to commission proceedings, and is not relevant to the discussion
here.
The third argument, however, was the heart of the matter. It again alleged that the
Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers created state obligations similar to those raised in the first
military commission proceeding, with additional detail on the applicable U.S. federal juvenile
law. The presiding officer’s ruling, which denied the motion, is terse; it decides these important
issues in a total of less than three pages of analysis. As to international law, the presiding officer
found that “neither customary international law nor international treaties binding upon the United
States prohibit the trial of a person for alleged violations of the law of nations committed when
he was 15 years of age.”127 This is an issue that the defense had conceded in its reply,128 but
argued that if prosecution was to proceed, it must be accompanied by protections of juveniles
guaranteeing their rehabilitation and reintegration, and should be conducted under the domestic
juvenile law.
The decision is also interesting in at least three other respects. First, both the defense and
commission used the silence of Congress on the issue of the trial of juveniles in the MCA to
advance their arguments or conclusions based on principles of statutory interpretation. The
defense argued that nothing prevented Congress from providing for the prosecution of minors,
and yet the MCA failed to provide for such prosecutions; their silence was evidence that they did
not wish trials of juveniles. While the presiding officer in the Khadr case did not address this
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issue, the officer in Jawad, another commission case involving a juvenile, did. The presiding
officer there found that because “both Mohammed Jawad and Omar Khadr have been in U.S.
custody at Guantanamo Bay since 2002, a fact that Congress is aware of, Congress could have
provided for an age requirement when enacting the [MCA]; it chose not to.”129 Generally, silence
by Congress does not lend itself to easy statutory interpretation: not every silence is pregnant, as
one authority argues.130
A second aspect of the decision denying the motion to dismiss is its improper invocation
of the “last in time” rule in U.S. law. The decision finds that even though the Protocol is the law
of the land, the adoption of the MCA comes later, and “a federal statute, passed after the
ratification of a treaty, prevails over contrary provisions of a treaty.” As authority for this
assertion, the presiding officer cites to an 1889 Supreme Court decision in the Chinese Exclusion
cases.131 This may be true where, as cited, the provisions of the statute are contrary to the treaty,
but if the two documents can be read together without conflict, courts should do so, according to
the long-established rule of interpretation laid down in the Charming Betsy case.132 Here, the
MCA is a general statute for the establishment of jurisdiction and rules of procedure. It is silent
on the issue of the treatment of juveniles, while the Optional Protocol is specific on the treatment
of juveniles. Here, silence in the statute leaves the courts to supplement that silence with the
treaty source in order to provide faithful and consistent interpretation of governmental
obligations. The later MCA, on its face, does not conflict with the earlier treaty, and says nothing
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as to abrogation of obligations under the Optional Protocol, which the Congress explicitly found
to be self-executing.
Finally, the commission declines to reach the crucial issues briefed by the defense and
amici dealing with what the presiding officer calls “the United States’ duties and obligations
concerning rehabilitation and reintegration of Mr. Khadr.” That issue, the commission concludes
“should be addressed to a forum other than a military commission.”133 Alternatively, at least
implicitly, the commission leaves this issue to the Convening Authority: “The Commission
assumes, without deciding, that the Convening Authority considers the circumstances of each
case and each accused before referring a case to trial. Whether or not being tried for alleged
crimes is rehabilitative is not a question before this commission.”134 As noted earlier, the federal
district court declined to hear this very same issue on grounds that it would be decided by the
military commission first. Thus, this particular child challenging proceedings under the Optional
Protocol was left without any forum to address the issue, as both defer to other authorities.135 It is
here that the commission most clearly abdicated its responsibility to resolve the issue.
IV.

Omar Khadr as a child in the Canadian courts

At the same time that Omar’s case proceeded in the U.S. legal system, his family retained
Canadian counsel to represent his interests in the Canadian courts.136 Their options for legal
action on Omar’s behalf in the Canadian judicial system seemed extremely limited, due to
133
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Omar’s custody by the United States, but these lawyers fought courageously on Omar’s behalf
through a series of challenges to the actions of the Canadian government in its conduct of foreign
relations, and in visits by Canadian officials to Omar prior to Omar’s access to lawyers or the
courts in any country.
As one authority on the Canadian proceedings notes, three successive Canadian Prime
Ministers refused to grant a request by the Khadr family for his repatriation, despite the fact that
other U.S. allies had seen the release of their nationals from Guantanamo.137 The primary focus
of the Canadian federal court litigation, with two appeals to the Canadian Supreme Court, related
to two issues: first, visits by Canadian officials to Omar Khadr for intelligence purposes and the
surrender of the fruits of those visits to U.S. officials; and second, the obligation of Canadian
officials to formally seek repatriation of their national from Guantanamo. The responses by the
Canadian courts, particularly the lower federal courts, provide, on the one hand, a stark contrast
to the federal courts of the United States regarding the reception and application of international
law to resolve domestic issues, although ultimately the Canadian Supreme Court resolved most
issues exclusively on domestic grounds. On the other hand, these decisions cumulatively had
virtually no impact on Omar’s liberty or his day-to-day life, simply because of the limits of
territorial jurisdiction and the fact that Omar was in U.S. custody.
The Canadian Supreme Court first dealt with the Omar Khadr case in 2008, when it held
that the fruits of interviews with Omar Khadr, turned over to U.S. officials by Canadian
intelligence officers during interviews with him at Guantanamo, had to be turned over to his
Canadian lawyers.138 The lawyers argued that the source for his right to the materials in question
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lay in section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees protection of
life, liberty and property, and the right not to be deprived of those rights except in accordance
with “principles of fundamental justice.” Those principles, the Canadian courts had previously
held, can be found in Canada’s obligations under international human rights law. The justices
followed a simple analysis accepting that the effect of the decisions by the United States
Supreme Court in the Rasul and Hamdan cases was that “the conditions under which Mr. Khadr
was held and was liable for prosecution were illegal under both U.S. and international law at the
time Canadian officials interviewed Mr. Khadr and gave information to U.S. authorities.”139 If
Omar’s status as a juvenile was important to the court’s reasoning, it is not apparent from its
ruling, which mentions only once in passing that Omar was 15 years old at the time of his
capture.140 But the litigation did not end with that decision; in fact, it was just beginning.
The following year, a federal court in Toronto held that Omar had the right, also under
section 7 of the Canadian Charter, to judicial review of the decision by the government not to
request his repatriation. The knowing involvement by Canadian officials in Omar’s mistreatment
in prison (the subject of the prior litigation) was sufficient to overcome the deference normally
accorded to the executive branch in making repatriation decisions.141 Most significantly, federal
judge James O’Reilly did two things that no other court, in the U.S. or Canada, had done before.
First, he relied on numerous international human rights instruments to inform his interpretation
of section 7’s principles of fundamental justice: the Convention against Torture; the Convention
on the Rights of the Child; and most importantly, the Protocol on Child Soldiers.142 Second, the
court relied heavily on Omar’s status as a child in his rationale. That reliance merits a closer
139
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look, as it is unique among the decisions reviewed in this article. Moreover, as appeals from
Judge O’Reilly’s decision progressed, Omar’s status as a minor recedes in importance in the
reasoning of the courts.
Judge O’Reilly based his ruling firmly on a determination that “on detention, Mr. Khadr
was ‘given no special status as a minor’ even though he was only 15 when he was arrested and
16 at the time he was transferred to Guantanamo Bay.”143 Immediately after this finding, the
court notes that Canadian officials had been implicated in the “frequent flier” program of sleep
deprivation designed to make Omar more willing to provide intelligence. “Mr. Khadr was then a
17-year-old minor, who was being detained without legal representation, with no access to his
family and no Canadian consular assistance.”144 Finally, in its reliance on the Optional Protocol,
the court found that “Canada was obliged to recognize that Mr. Khadr, being a child, was
vulnerable to being caught up in armed conflict as a result of his personal and social
circumstances in 2002 and before. It cannot resile from its recognition of the need to protect
minors, like Mr. Khadr, who are drawn into hostilities before they can apply mature judgment to
the choices they face.”145 Remarkably, in reaching this conclusion, the court was not only relying
on the text of the treaties, but interpreting Omar’s narrative with the same understanding that
flows through the recent jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court on the role of
cognitive brain development in the exercise of juvenile judgment.146 All of these factors
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combined to lead the court to conclude that factors relevant to the consideration of the protection
of Omar Khadr included “his youth; his need for medical attention; his lack of education; access
to consular assistance and legal counsel; his inability to challenge his detention or conditions of
confinement in a court of law; and his presence in an unfamiliar, remote and isolated prison, with
no family contact.”147 These factors resonate not only in principles of human rights law but also
in the core protections of the law of armed conflict regarding children. The government appealed
the decision to an intermediate appellate court for further review.
In the Ontario Federal Court of Appeals, new and highly relevant facts relating to Omar’s
status as a minor emerged publically for the first time. In its decision, the three-judge Court of
Appeals split 2 to 1, upholding the trial court’s decision that the government did not enjoy
unfettered discretion in its decisions regarding requests for repatriation of Canadian nationals
from abroad.148 For the first time in public, the court recited a series of diplomatic notes sent by
the Canadian government to its U.S. counterpart, some of which were sent before Omar’s
transfer to Guantanamo. Two notes, sent in August and September of 2002 while Omar was still
held at Bagram, noted that he was a minor, requested that he not be transferred to Guantanamo,
and “pointed out that the laws of Canada and the United States require special treatment for
minors with regard to legal and judicial processes.”149 Notes sent in 2003, after Omar’s transfer
to the base but before he had gained access to counsel, again requested “special consideration” of
his status as a minor, and noted that he was not being treated like other juvenile detainees (July 9,
2003); requested assurances that he would not face the death penalty if charged with crimes
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(October 6, 2003); and requested assurances of medical treatment for injuries (November 12,
2003).150 No formal responses to any of these inquiries appeared in the appellate record.
Aside from the possible relevance that these diplomatic notes might have had in our own
litigation to seek independent medical treatment for Omar, they are vitally relevant to views of
the Canadian government officials about juveniles in armed conflict. Without examining the
legal basis of their assertions, one can draw two immediate inferences from their
communications. First, Canadian officials, unlike the United States military, viewed Omar as a
juvenile both at the time of his capture and his later detention to Guantanamo at age 16. Second,
Canadian officials believed that as a juvenile, Omar was entitled to either entirely avoid
detention at Guantanamo, or if held there, to conditions that vastly differed from those to which
he was actually subjected. The transfer of the Afghan children to Camp Iguana and their
treatment there provide a useful analogy. The Court of Appeals, like the court of first instance,
invoked the Convention against Torture and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, but the
Optional Protocol is conspicuously absent from its reasoning.151 The reviewing court put more
weight on mistreatment than juvenile status, providing extended analysis of the definition of
torture and the link of the principle of fundamental justice to the prohibition on cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment, which is characterized as a peremptory or jus cogens norm of customary
international law.152 In any event, the case would go to the highest court of Canada a second
time.
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On January 29, 2010, in its second round of Khadr litigation, the Canadian Supreme
Court overturned that aspect of the lower courts’ decisions dealing with repatriation, finding
itself without the institutional competence to determine such diplomatic issues.153 By this time
the case had attracted even more international attention, and a total of nine friend-of-court briefs
were filed, all on Omar Khadr’s behalf.154 The high court, however, retreated to a posture similar
to that taken in its 2008 decision on the matter, reiterating the constitutional violation of section
7, with only a whisper of international law. Its operative paragraph held as follows:
“Interrogation of a youth, to elicit statements about the most serious criminal charges while
detained in these conditions and without access to counsel, and while knowing that the fruits of
the interrogation would be shared with the U.S. prosecutors, offends the most basic Canadian
standards about the treatment of detained youth suspects.”155 Gone are all references to either the
Torture Convention or Convention on the Rights of the Child and its the Optional Protocol. As
one scholar notes, “[t]he Court did not acknowledge the international law arguments raised by
either side” as to the relationship between fundamental justice and international human rights.156
Gone too is the court’s reliance, but for a small nod, on Omar Khadr’s status as a child as a
determining factor in the determination of fundamental justice.
The Canadian lawyers continued the fight, returning to litigate the issue in the lower
courts. A lower federal court ordered the government to provide a list of potential remedial
options for violation of Omar’s Charter rights,157 but an appellate court dismissed the matter as
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moot following Omar’s plea of guilty in military commission proceedings.158 This seems a sad
denouement to the most far-reaching judicial intervention on behalf of the rights of the child seen
in this review of litigation on behalf of Omar Khadr.
V.

Omar Khadr as a child in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
and other international bodies

This short section will deal with two dimensions of international advocacy regarding the
Omar Khadr case. First, it will examine actions taken by students from the International Human
Rights Law Clinic on behalf of Omar Khadr in the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights.159 It will then briefly summarize the other actions known by the author to have taken
place in international bodies which explicitly address Omar Khadr’s situation at Guantanamo
Bay.
A. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
Students began preparing submissions for the Inter-American Commission during the
2005-06 school year when it became apparent that the U.S. courts would either ignore or skirt the
most essential issues relating to his detention as a child. Finding no available forum within the
United States, students developed a strategy of parallel litigation in the international forum.
Students prepared two documents: a contentious petition against the United States on behalf of
Omar Khadr individually, and a request for precautionary measures. Both documents
exhaustively examined international human rights law with regard to Omar Khadr’s situation.
The Commission’s Rules of Procedure provide for precautionary measures in “serious
and urgent situations,” in order “to prevent irreparable harm to persons under the jurisdiction of
158
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the State concerned.”160 Precautionary measures are a kind of international injunctive action, and
can be taken ex parte by the Commission; they may even be requested without the
contemporaneous filing of a petition, as was the case with the original request for precautionary
measures for all unnamed detainees in early 2002. Generally, requests for precautionary
measures can be obtained quite quickly, often within days or weeks of filing. Contentious cases,
unfortunately, have a much longer time frame, sometimes years before resolution.
In our case, the matter was rendered simple by the direction of our client. Omar, after
careful consultation and explanation of the process, agreed to proceed with the request for
precautionary measures, but explicitly requested that we not file the contentious petition on his
behalf. We honored that request and filed only the precautionary measures request on January
17, 2006.161 The request was replete with allegations and legal sources on the protection of
children in armed conflict. Students appeared at the Commission in early March of 2006 for oral
presentation of the request to a panel of three commissioners, arguing against a large team of
lawyers – civilian and military – from the U.S. delegation. Again, aspects of Omar’s status as a
child stood out in the arguments on his behalf. On March 21, 2006, the Commission granted the
request, asking the United States to take measures to protect Omar from further mistreatment
during interrogations and to investigate his claims of torture at the hands of his interrogators.162
Remarkably, to our utter surprise and disappointment, the letter requesting precautionary
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measures made no mention of Omar’s age or status as a minor. We could only guess that his
status did not figure in their calculus of urgency, but it certainly could have been relevant to risk
of harm. There is no recorded response of the United States to the request.
B. Action in Other International Bodies
The United Nations mechanisms for consideration of issues regarding children in armed
conflict are numerous, and their activity on those issues is continuous. Examples include ongoing
resolutions of the General Assembly on rights of the child163 and the reports of the Secretary
General on children in armed conflict.164 Only rarely does the UN, its treaty bodies or related
agencies go on record with regard to specific cases. It has done so through at least three organs
with regard to the Omar Khadr case: UNICEF, the UN children’s agency; the general reporting
process of the Committee on the Rights of the Child; and the Special Representative of the
Secretary General on Children in Armed Conflict.
As early as May 2008, UNICEF, the United Nations Children’s Fund, expressed
“concern about the fate of Omar Khadr.” In a brief press announcement, the child protection
spokesman at UNICEF, Geoffrey Keele, “insists that Omar Khadr should be treated as a victim
of adults rather than as a criminal.” His trial would, said Keele, “set a dangerous precedent for
other children affected by conflict.”165 Two years later, when the Khadr trial seemed imminent,
UNICEF spoke up again. Anthony Lake, a former national security advisor to President Clinton
and now head of UNICEF, again spoke of the dangerous precedent of the case, called for
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prosecution of only the recruiters of children, and noted that the children “are victims, acting
under coercion.”166
The Committee on the Rights of the Child receives periodic reports from states parties to
either the Convention on the Rights of the Child or its protocols. The United States submitted its
first report in June of 2007.167 In conjunction with the submission of the report, which made no
direct mention of either Guantanamo or Omar Khadr, the Committee submitted a list of written
questions for response. The written responses of the United States government to specific
questions about Guantanamo and the children there noted and discussed the case of Omar Khadr
in several paragraphs, all of which justified their actions as legal.168
The Committee, as is customary, issued its concluding observations on the report of the
United States in June of 2008.169 Again, although it did not explicitly mention Omar Khadr’s
case, the observations were pointed. They expressed “concern” that children were being tried at
Guantanamo for war crimes “rather than being considered primarily as victims,” and “without
due account of their status as children.” The Committee recommended, inter alia, that “detention
of children at Guantanamo Bay should be prevented,” and that children there be provided with
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“physical and psychological recovery measures, including educational programmes and sports
and leisure activities, as well as measures for all detained children’s social reintegration.”170
Radhika Coomaraswamy serves as the UN Special Representative of the Secretary
General on Children in Armed Conflict. During 2009 and 2010, she boldly spoke out on at least
five occasions about the pending charges and ultimate disposition of the Khadr case in military
commission proceedings. Even before her official statements, there was a request by Omar’s
military lawyers to permit a representative of her office to attend the Khadr military commission
proceedings as an observer. The request was denied.171

Her first public comments were in August of 2009, when Ms. Coomaraswamy welcomed
the release of another child in commission proceedings, Mohammed Jawad. The statement,
headed as “All Juvenile Detainees Must be Released from Guantanamo,” quoted her as saying
that the trial of a minor “would have created a dangerous international precedent," if Jawad’s
case had gone to trial. She expressed the hope for the release of Omar Khadr “soon.”172 In
October of 2009, the Special Representative ramped up her criticism. In an extended statement to
the Third Committee of the UN, she again welcomed the release of Mohammed Jawad from
Guantanamo. What she then said about the Khadr case merits extended quotation:

[W]e look forward to similar action being taken with regard to Omar Khadr.
Children should be made aware of the gravity of their acts but not in the context
of a war crime prosecution. Children may be required to undergo procedures
related to truth and reconciliation commissions or other restorative justice
measures that are relevant to their societies, so that they understand that certain
types of behaviour will not be tolerated. But we must not forget that they are
170
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primarily victims of adult cunning and cruelty, and therefore should be
rehabilitated and assisted to find a constructive role in society.173
In May and October of 2010, as proceedings in the military commission intensified, Ms.
Coomaraswamy again spoke out against trial. In the May statement, she called on Canada and
the United States to respect the spirit of the Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers, and to release
Omar Khadr without trial. “Like other children abused by armed groups around the world who
are repatriated to their home communities and undergo re-education for their reintegration,” she
stated, “Omar should be given the same protections afforded these children.”174 In October of
2010, on the occasion of what was planned to be the start of his trial, she again spoke out
strongly: “The Omar Khadr case will set a precedent that may endanger the status of child
soldiers all over the world.”175 Despite her escalating words, however, Omar’s case proceeded to
its conclusion. Her final action was a letter from her office to “members of the military
commission,” dated 27 October 2010, after his plea of guilty but before his final sentencing. The
letter was her most direct and most passionate. She reiterated the obligation of parties of the
Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers to “support . . . reintegra[tion] into their families and
communities and that states parties should provide any necessary assistance to these children
wherever they are found.” She radically shifted the Omar Khadr narrative by arguing that the
facts show that “[i]n every sense Omar represents the classic child soldier narrative; recruited by
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unscrupulous groups to undertake actions at the bidding of adults to fight battles they barely
understand.”176
VI.

Conclusion: The outcome of the Khadr case and the intersections of
humanitarian and human rights law for a child charged with war crimes

At age 24, after spending more than a third of his young life in U.S. detention, and nearly
five years after he was initially charged with any crime, Omar Khadr pled guilty to multiple war
crimes before a military commission at Guantanamo Bay on October 13, 2010. Though captured
at age 15, at no time did the U.S. government, in or out of court, ever acknowledge him as a
juvenile, as a minor, or as a child. No U.S. court overtly recognized his childhood as a
jurisdictional, procedural or mitigating factor in their decision-making. Neither courts nor other
institutions treated him as a child under international or U.S. law, both of which call for
rehabilitation as the primary mission of juvenile justice. Omar Khadr was treated as an adult for
all purposes. This final section will first examine the outcome of his case and the accompanying
narrative of Omar Khadr himself then explore some of the interaction of international human
rights and humanitarian law in his case in broader perspective.
A. The Outcome: Omar Khadr Pleads Guilty and Hopes to Return to Canada
The charges to which Omar Khadr pleaded guilty included the crimes of murder and
attempted murder “in violation of the laws of war,” conspiracy, material support for terrorism,
and spying. In the narrowest sense, both factually and legally, the stipulation of facts
accompanying Omar Khadr’s guilty plea contains all of the relevant “truth” about why Khadr’s
detention is justified. He admitted to the veracity of those facts in open court. The stipulation
bears extended quotation here, as it is relevant to the ensuing discussion on his accountability for
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those events, whether as a soldier or as a child. What follows is only that portion of the
stipulation that gave rise to the charge of “murder in violation of the laws of war,” for the death
of Sgt. Christopher Speer, part of the U.S. military force involved in the incident in question:
On 27 July 2002, Khadr was at a compound in Ayub Kheil with the al Qaeda explosives cell. U.S.
forces received information that suspected members of al Qaeda were operating out of the
compound and were conducting attacks against U.S. and coalition forces. Prior to the Americans
arriving, Khadr and the other cell members received word that the Americans were coming to their
location. While the owner of the compound, Aman Ullah, fled, Khadr stayed behind in order to
fight the Americans. U.S. forces then moved to the compound and asked the occupants, including
Khadr, to come outside of the compound to talk to the U.S. forces. At that time, Khadr knew that
the forces outside the compound were American. The request to the al Qaeda members was
relayed in both English and Pashto (the primary language in Afghanistan). Khadr is and was at
that time fluent in both English and Pashto.
When Khadr and the other al Qaeda cell members refused to come outside of the compound or to
speak to the U.S. forces, two members of the accompanying Afghan Military Forces entered the
main compound, raised their heads above a wall and again asked for the occupants of the
compound to come out and speak to the U.S. led forces. At that moment, individuals in the house
opened fire, instantly killing both Afghan soldiers. U.S. soldiers pulled the Afghan soldiers out of
the compound and a four-hour firefight between U.S. soldiers and the al Qaeda cell commenced.
***
Close air support was called in by the US forces. A-10s [ground-attack fighter jets] and Apache
attack helicopters dropped bombs (including two 500 pound bombs) and fired thousands of rounds
of ammunition into the compound. During the bombing, Khadr was injured in the eyes and leg by
shrapnel from a U.S. grenade.
***
After the U.S. forces believed the fIrefight was over, they began clearing the compound. A U.S.
Special Forces unit entered the compound. It was the belief of the U.S. forces that all individuals
inside the compound had been killed during the battle. After entering the compound the unit began
taking direct fire from an AK·47. One soldier saw the individual firing the AK· 47, engaged and
killed him.
Upon hearing the U.S. Special Forces soldiers, Khadr, positioned behind a crumbling wall, armed
and threw a Russian F-l grenade in the vicinity of the talking soldiers. Khadr threw the grenade
with the specific intent of killing or injuring as many Americans as he could. The grenade thrown
by Khadr exploded near Sergeant First Class ("SFC") Christopher Speer, launching shrapnel into
his head and causing mortal brain damage. SFC Speer was killed by the grenade that Khadr threw.
177
He died approximately 12 days later on 8 August 2002.

In fact, this snippet of the stipulation of fact is but a small part of an extended narrative
which includes information about Omar’s family, his activities in Afghanistan before his capture,
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and a general profile of Al Qaeda terrorist ends and activities (one that was included, in one
version or another, in the “evidence” supporting charges against all of those appearing in military
commission proceedings, and without any discernible nexus to the actions of the accused).178
Notably, the stipulation contains no information about the nature or conditions of Omar’s
detention or his treatment during interrogation. Although Omar’s age at the time of his capture is
mentioned, it appears to have had no mitigating impact, at least on the record.
The death of Sgt. Speer, and Omar Khadr’s responsibility for it, was the heart of the
prosecution against him. Yet many observers raised serious questions about whether Omar did
throw the grenade that killed Speer. Though he allegedly confessed to the killing, he argued and
lost on the question of whether his statements were coerced or involuntary, the product of harsh,
repeated and continuous interrogations. There was also the troubling statement by a U.S.
commando at the compound in Afghanistan, mistakenly provided to reporters during a pre-trial
commission hearing in February 2008. The report by the soldier, known as OC-1, describes the
moments after the grenade was thrown:
He heard moaning coming from the back of the compound. The dust rose up from the ground and
began to clear, he then saw a man facing him lying on his right side . . . The man had an AK-47 on
the ground beside him and the man was moving. OC-1 fired one round striking the man in the
head and the movement ceased. Dust was again stirred by this rifle shot. When the dust rose, he
saw a second man sitting facing away from him leaning against the brush. This man, later
identified as Khadr, was moving . . . OC-1 fired two rounds both of which struck Khadr in the
back. OC-1 estimated that from the initiation of the approach to the compound to shooting Khadr
took no more than 90 seconds, with all of the events inside the compound happening in less than a
minute.179

The military’s own document thus confirms that Omar Khadr was sitting down on the
ground, facing away from the entrance, and was shot twice immediately after the troops entered,
casting doubt on his ability to lob a grenade beyond the compound’s walls at that moment or just

178
179

Most notably, the materials on “Al Qaeda Background” begin in 1989, when Omar was 2 years old.
Quoted in GUANTANAMO’S CHILD, supra n. 14, at 224-225.

58

Draft of January 9, 2012
before. The doubt injected into the commission proceedings by this document was shared by
many. One NGO observer opined: “Although the government did not appear to have any
forensic or eyewitness testimony to support its murder charge, government interrogators planned
to testify that Khadr had willingly told them that he threw the grenade that killed Sergeant First
Class Christopher Speer. Whether he said that because it was true, or because he was a scared
and wounded 15-year-old expecting a quick release for telling his interrogators what they wanted
to hear, we'll never know.”180 Another observer, Andrea Prasow, had worked as a civilian in the
commission’s military defense office before going to work for Human Rights Watch. She had
visited with Omar Khadr at Guantanamo. Her conclusions on the sentencing hearing bear
extended quotation:
The plea agreement leaves many questions unanswered. Indeed, we will never even know
for sure if Khadr was responsible for killing a US soldier. Prior to the trial, there were
compelling indications that another al Qaeda militant actually threw the grenade that
killed Sergeant Speer. Even if scientific developments would make greater certainty
possible in the future, Khadr's plea agreement includes a promise never to pursue forensic
testing of the evidence, and allows the US government to destroy all the evidence
following sentencing. Khadr has also waived all appeals and promised not to pursue
litigation against the US government in any forum for any matter relating to his detention
and trial. No jury will ever hear Khadr's allegations of abuse or the admissions of abuse
by a US interrogator.181

There were, of course, other serious charges, and Omar Khadr pled guilty to every
charge. What appears clear, however, was that a U.S. soldier had died at the hands of terrorists,
and Omar Khadr was the only person who survived that day, so he would pay the price.
In return for Omar Khadr’s plea of guilty, the Convening Authority for military
commissions agreed not to approve a sentence of confinement of greater than eight years, with
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no credit for time served (as required under the military commissions statute), and further that
after at least one more year at Guantanamo, he was eligible to be transferred to Canada to serve
out the remainder of his sentence under Canadian law.182 This complex plea agreement, however,
did not settle the matter of sentencing. In what might be described as bizarre kabuki theater,
performed exclusively for the press, a full sentencing hearing in the Khadr case was held before
a sentencing jury in Guantanamo just after he entered his plea of guilty. It was agreed that if the
jury returned a verdict greater than the eight years for which Omar had bargained, he would
serve only the eight years agreed to previously. If the verdict was lower, he would receive the
more lenient sentence.
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution was permitted to put on testimony from Sgt.
Layne Morris, a soldier injured during Omar’s capture, and Tabitha Speer, the widow of
Christopher Speer, the U.S. soldier who died in the compound.183 A controversial “expert,”
Michael Welner, also testified for the prosecution, calling Omar an “al-Qaeda rock star.”
Another expert, Navy Capt. Patrick McCarthy, described Omar as a “model prisoner, respectful
and helpful to military personnel,”184 the military sentencing panel passed a sentence of 40 years
imprisonment on October 31, 2010. That sentence became the public narrative of the Defense
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Department, touting the efficacy of military commissions.185 It was, however, legally irrelevant,
as the plea deal meant that Omar would serve only the 8 years to which all parties agreed.
There is yet another sad post-script to the Omar Khadr saga. At the time of this writing,
in late December 2011, there is no realistic prospect that Omar will be transferred back to
Canada anytime in the near future. This is true despite what most of the press took to be part of
the plea agreement that after one additional year at Guantanamo, or about the end of October
2011, Omar would be transferred to serve the remainder of his eight-year sentence in Canada,
with the domestic law of Canada controlling the issues of his release from prison.186 Canadian
news media note that a request for transfer has been lodged by the Canadian attorneys, but that
Canadian officials have said that even without objections, “a decision could take up to 18
months.”187
U.S. officials note that they cannot act until they receive a formal request, and that new
U.S. law requires, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, that the Secretary
of Defense certify to Congress that “Canada is a fit place to send a convicted terrorist, a nation
not likely to permit him to attack the United States, and one that has control over its prisons.”188
The pre-trial agreement signed before Omar’s guilty plea explicitly states that non-acceptance by
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the Canadian government of an application for transfer “will have no impact on this
agreement.”189 In other words, Omar could serve his entire remaining sentence in Cuba.
Omar Khadr made a formal statement at sentencing hearing. This was one of the few
times he had spoken publicly since his detention – he had never testified in open court, and the
others had been brief statements during his commission proceedings. His voice was otherwise
silenced. He noted that his education stopped at eighth grade, that his hobbies were sports and
reading. His biggest dream was to get out of Guantanamo, then to become a doctor. Invoking
Nelson Mandela, he had concluded that “you’re not going to gain anything with hate . . . love
and forgiveness are more constructive and will bring people together.” He stood and spoke
directly to Tabitha Speer: “I’m really sorry for the pain I’ve caused you and your family. I wish I
could do something that would take this pain away from you. This is all I can say.”190
What then is the “true” story of Omar Khadr, the child-man of Guantanamo? In a
forthcoming book on “reimagining” child soldiers, Prof. Mark Drumbl suggests that what he
calls the “international legal imagination,” essentializes the child soldier into one of four images:
the “guileless naïf,” “irreparable damaged goods,” the “hero,” or the “demon and bandit.” The
first category, what alternatively might be called the “faultless passive victim,” carries great
weight in the hierarchy of these images in that imagination.191 His overall point is that this is too
narrow a vision of the child soldier, one that dehumanizes the real children. The legal
imagination, he argues, must construct a more nuanced view of the child in armed conflict.192
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Without question, it was the mission of the United States government, largely through the
Pentagon and the White House, to characterize all of the publicly known children at Guantanamo
as demons and bandits, what Drumbl details as “irredeemable, baleful, and sinister. Pursuant to
this depiction, the child soldier is a ticking time bomb, bad seed, and warped soul incorrigibly.”
Such was clearly the intent of General Myers and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in the excerpt
included as one of three headnotes to this article. Once cast in this mold, investment in
rehabilitation of the demon seems pointless.193
My own view is informed by sitting with Omar for hours at a time over many, many
sessions. Sometimes these sessions were intense and emotional, and sometimes they were
boring, but we discussed virtually all aspects of his young life, at least those he was willing to
disclose. By the time we met him, of course, he was already 18 years old, but he was still a boy.
He was small and had almost no facial hair. He fit none of the four images proposed by Drumbl;
not even close. Omar was certainly neither demon nor bandit. He was, in my view, a highly
adaptable and social survivor, someone who could use his easy and genuine smile, as well as his
multiple linguistic skills (English, Arabic, Pashtu and Urdu) to provide easy access to almost any
community. He had a kind of innate sensitivity to the emotions of others that he used as a
barometer for his own reactions to them. He read a good deal; Harry Potter was a favorite. I
never felt that he kept the truth from us over time, at least as he experienced it. To me, he was an
honest, sincere and eminently likable kid.
B. A Few Reflections on the Operation of International Law in the Khadr Case
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When and how did international human rights and humanitarian law interact in judicial
decisions of the U.S. courts involving Omar Khadr? The answer is simple: almost never. When
one adds the decisions of Canadian courts and international bodies, the answer becomes a bit
more complex, but not exponentially so. The simple fact is that there was precious little
interaction of legal doctrines on children in armed conflict in any dispositive decision in Omar
Khadr’s case. This is certainly true in the jurisprudence of the Canadian Supreme Court, and in
the precautionary measures decision of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
Before examining those precious few instances where interaction did occur, it might be useful to
reflect on why international law on children, whether in armed conflict or not, was so scarce in
operative court decisions. There are obvious as well as more subtle answers to why the courts
avoided the international law issues relating to children.
The most obvious reason the courts ignored international law relating to children has to
do with my repeated invocation of context. The voice of the government in responding to the
attacks of 9/11 was, not to coin a phrase, extremely loud and incredibly close. If possible, that
voice was even further amplified by the Pentagon’s hired “message force multipliers,” (as only
the military could so designate), individuals provided by the armed services with talking points
to present when they appeared as supposedly neutral military analysts on television or in other
media.194 The drumbeat for vengeance was strong and constant, and the Khadr family, with
identified ties to al Qaeda, was an easy target. Omar’s own young, inexperienced and isolated
voice was a tiny whisper by comparison, nearly gagged by government restrictions on
communication with the outside world. Above all, an American soldier had died, and Omar was
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believed to be responsible. Notably, even the most sympathetic scholars writing on the Omar
Khadr case often accept the narrative of Omar as trained and hardened terrorist operative.
A second obvious reason for non-distinction as a child was that Omar Khadr was part of
the huge Guantanamo “collective,” a group of 779 people with extremely complex legal issues,
issues that three trips to the United States Supreme Court have left far from settled. From the
very start, those larger issues pulled attention away from more isolated issues such as juvenile
status. This was nowhere more apparent than in the decision of Judge Green in the U.S. District
Court, dealing with the most crucial common issues of the eleven detainees before her and
summarily dismissing all others, including the application of any of the treaties dealing with
children in armed conflict, and virtually the entire body of customary international law. Her
decision on that matter technically precluded consideration of the issue by the U.S. federal courts
for years. A third and related issue is the general antipathy by the U.S. courts to reaching any
issue of moment through the invocation of international human rights or humanitarian law as the
doctrinal fulcrum. U.S. courts have shown their discomfort, usually through inexperience, with
these bodies of law, as well as their distinctive inclination towards domestic law for resolution of
complex or underdeveloped areas. The Bush and Obama administrations have both shrewdly
played to that discomfort by further blurring definitions to justify strong executive discretion in
terrorism cases.
One final factor deserves mention, one so obvious as to sometimes slip by unnoticed.
That is the simple passage of time. By the time he arrived at Guantanamo, Omar was 16. By the
time he saw anyone other than interrogators or guards, Omar was a legal adult of 18. By the time
criminal charges were brought, he was 19, well over six feet tall with full, dark facial hair. He
looked adult. And by the time pre-trial skirmishing began in earnest, he was well into his second
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decade of life. It was, in my view, crucial to the analysis of Omar’s situation by Judge Bates, in
both of the initial habeas challenges by Omar, that he purportedly sought prospective protection
only, and that the protections accorded to adults were not the same as those for children.
Although, logically, the law to be applied is that of the time of the original alleged offenses,
when Omar was a young 15, it was hard to see him for anything other than the strapping adult he
appeared to be in the courtroom. Although the unreasonable passage of time from offense to
trial, totally apart from domestic speedy trial concepts, is a relevant factor in international human
rights law, 195 that issue is not unique to juveniles, and for all the reasons stated above, would
likely have been as unavailing as the others.
There were a few occasions when the courts and UN bodies did look at how the question
of Omar’s childhood should be understood through international law. Curiously, when given the
clearest opportunity to do that, based on pleadings and friend-of-court submissions, neither the
federal district court nor the military commission reached the issue at all, with both Judge Bates
and the presiding officer deferring based on purely domestic legal interpretations. Judge James
O’Reilly, in Canada, applied international norms in his federal court ruling of April 2009 relating
to judicial review of an executive branch decision not to repatriate. Judge O’Reilly read
“fundamental justice” notions in Section 7 of the Canadian Charter through human rights law,
with some reliance on humanitarian law. He relied on the Convention Against Torture for its
definition of torture and for its provisions relating to the duty not to use evidence obtained by
torture in judicial proceedings.196 As to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, he again
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largely relied on portions of that treaty dealing with human rights, with no additional sources.197
The Protocol on Child Soldiers also figured in his decision, although only marginally. He found
it had no direct application to Canada in Omar Khadr’s circumstances, but that it is based on
“broader principles” set out in the preamble which recognize the special needs of children
vulnerable to recruitment of child victims of armed conflict, and to provide for rehabilitation and
reintegration.198 As such, the Optional Protocol was invoked more for its human rights
dimensions than any other reason. In the Court of Appeals’ review of the O’Reilly decision, as
noted above, review on international law grounds was narrower than the federal court. The
Ontario Court of Appeals invoked the Torture Convention and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child in their interpretation of Section 7 obligations of fundamental justice, but the latter
treaty only with regard to its protections of children against torture and other cruel treatment.199
Thus, the appellate court was more narrowly relying on general human rights norms, and not
explicitly on Omar’s status as a child as a source for relief.
The UN bodies present an interesting contrast. These bodies have a certain uniformity to
their approach. All use the language of Omar Khadr as “victim” rather than soldier. UNICEF and
the Committee on the Rights of the Child made general references, respectively, to the need for
“special protection” of children, and to the need to give “due account to [Guantanamo
detainees’] status as children.” Both of these invoke general human rights obligations to children.
Not surprisingly, however, the Special Representative on Children in Armed Conflict and the
Committee on the Rights of the Child, reviewing U.S. compliance with the Optional Protocol on
Child Soldiers, focused on state obligations to rehabilitate and reintegration, both notions that
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arise in the context of humanitarian law. Both UNICEF and the Special Representative pointed
to the risky or dangerous precedent set by the U.S. decision to prosecute a child for war crimes,
also a concept related to humanitarian law, with implicit human rights guarantees of due process
and fair trial. None of the UN bodies to speak to the issue stepped beyond the narrow confines of
their mandates, or a narrow reading of international instruments, to apply or suggest the use of
additional norms from either human rights or humanitarian law.200
In the final analysis, the tribunals that could have held the United States to account for its
non-compliance with international law utterly failed to do so. As such, they abdicated a
responsibility not only to Omar Khadr but to us all.
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